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1.  Introduction 
·Initially  conceived  for  intra-Community  balance-of-payments  support,  macro-financial • ·· 
assistance from the Community has been extended since 1990 ·to third countries, mainly 
those  of Central  and .  Eastern  Europe,  with  a  view  to  supporting "their  political  and. 
economic reform efforts.  As they embarked on their process of transition to a market· 
economy, the countries of  this region were faced with similar problems: 
- The ,  costs attached to the first  steps of reform,  liberalization and stabilization,  were 
substantial;  in particular:  commitment to unify  the exchange markets. and  make the 
national currency convertible for current account transactions at an early stage of the 
reform process required raising the level of international reserves of those countries; 
and some countries were also over-burdened by  a sizeable public debt inherited from 
the previous regime. 
- In addition to the needs relating to the transition efforts, the Central and East European 
countries (CEECs) faced  additional  external  shocks  : the consequences of the Gulf 
War, including the embargo which had particularly severe effects in economies such as 
Bulgaria;  the dramatic collapse of the  COMECON trading  system,  which had been 
based on state-directed flows of goods at artificial prices; and later,  the effect of the 
trade embargo on Serbia-Monteaegro. 
- The sums available from the International Financial Institutions {IFis)- mostly the IMF 
·and the World Bank-were insufficient. 
. 
- Flows  from  the  private  sector  were  virtually  non-existent  because  of the  relative 
unfamiliarity with the economies concerned and the great. uncertainties surrounding the 
first stages of  the reform and transition process. 
Against  this  background,  the European CommuniW  decided  to extend  macro-financial 
assistance to the countries in the region in complement to the financing provided by the 
IFis.  It was  also  decided  that,  in  the  context of the  assistance  co-ordination process 
agreed  among the 24 industrial countries  (G~24) to help  the CEECs, the Commission 
should  get  other  donors  to  contribute  in  a  similar  way  to  support  the  economic 
programmes  that  these  countries  were  implementing  in  agreement  with  the  IMF  and 
World Bank. 
In early 1991, at the initiative of  the European Commission, a set of  principles was agreed 
among  the  G-24  that  have  since  served  as  guidelines  for  EU/G-24  macro-financial 
assistance; accordingly, the operations have conformed with the following principles1 : 
(i)  exceptional character: all operations are undertaken on _a  strictly case-by-case basis. 
The operations are to be discontinued when the. recipient country can fully•rely on 
financing from the IFis and private sources of  capital; 
These principles were recently reconfirmed by the Council. • 
'  2 
(ii)  complementaritt: the basic prerequisite for the mobilization of the assistance is the 
existence  of a  significant  residual  external  financilig  gap  over  and  above  the 
resources  provided  by  the IMF  and  other multilateral  institutions  and  despite  the 
implementation of  strong economic stabilization and reform programmes. 
(iii)  conditioMijty:  the  assistance  is  generally  released  in  successive  tranches,  the 
disbursement  of  each  of  them  being  conditional  upon  the  fulfilment  of 
macroeconomic performance and structural ujustment criteria,· consistent with .  the  ... 
ecQnomic programmes agreed ~een  the beneficiary countries and the IMF. 
A number of  such support operations by the EU and the G-24 took place in  1990-1993 
covering  most  centrai  and  eastern  European  countries  eligible  to  G-24  as,,istance 
(Table 1): 
- The  first  Community  macro-financial  operation  for  a  third  country  dates  back  to 
February  1990, when the Council decided to  provide Hungary with a five-year ECU 
870 million  loan  facility  in support  of the  country's  efforts  to  overcome  structural 
adjustment difficulties in the context of  an IMF stand-by arrangement. 
- In 1991, the Council adopted four new decisions granting financial assistance to CEECs 
totalling ECU 1220 million: ECU 37S million for Czechoslovakia; ECU 290 million for 
Bulgaria; ECU 37S million for Romania and a further ECU 180 million for Hungaryl. 
- In late  1992, another series of Community operations was decided by the Council for 
CEECs, amounting to ECU 480 million, comprising: a further ECU 110 million loan for  . 
Bulgaria; a further ECU 80 million loan for Romania; an ECU 220 million loan to the 
Baltic  States  (  40  million  for  Estonia,  80  million  for  Latvia  and  I 00  million  for 
Lithuania), and a grant ofECU 70 million to Albania3,4. 
Outside the region of  Central and Eastern Europe, two other Community loan operations 
were  decided  by  the  Council  in  1991.  In  the  context  of Community  support  for 
Mediterranean  countries  adversely  affected  by  the  Gulf  conflict,  the  Council  made 
available  to  Israel  an  ECU  160 million  soft  loan  in  July  1991.  In  September  1991,  a 
medium-term loan of ECU 400 million was also decided in favour of Algeria to help the 
country carry through the political and economic reforms under way4. 
2.  Macro-financial assistance in 1994 
In  1994, Community macro-financial assistance was  provided to  a series of countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the European New Independent States (NIS) issued from the 
former Soviet Union, and the Mediterranean area, in a total amount of ECU 620 million 
(Table 1). 
2  See: Report on the implementation of medium-term financial assistance to the balances of payments 
of  Central and East European countries, COM(92)400 of 16 September·l992. 
3  There was no new operations in 1993. 
4  See: Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries, COM(94)229 of  7 
June 1994 . 
• . 
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· New operations in favour of CEECs comprised a further loan of  up to ECU  125 million 
for  Romani~ a further grant of up to ECU 35 millioD for Albania;  and  a ·loan of up to 
ECU ·130 million for the Slovak Republic. Purtliermore, the loan to Bulgaria, which had 
been  dec~ in· 1992,  but  could  not.  be  disbursed  owing  to  bad  macroeconomic 
perfollll8i)ce  in  1993, -wu  reactivated  in  1994.  in  the  contm of a new  economic 
programme. ~  in the previous years, all these initiatives were taken in the context of  G-
24  financing  packages  complementing·. resources  provided  by  the  IFis.  OveriB,  the 
requeata for exceptional financial ~  from the G-24 totaJled USS  97-7  mjllion,  of 
which the Community contributed approximately half  (bringing cumulative requests for G-
24 ~to  .USS 4.3 billion since 1991, Table 2). 
Operations in. favour of European NIS  comprised  ;1  loan  of up  to ECU 45  million for 
Moldova; and of  up to ECU 85  million for Ukraine: These initiatives were taken in the 
. context  of. exceptional  international  assistance  co-ordinated  by  the  World  Bank,  that 
QlObilized  respeaively  USS  130·-million,  and  US$ 185  million  of new  financing  to 
complement resources by the IFis. In the ~  of  Ukraine, Russian and Turkmenistan also 
provided substantial bilateral contributions through restructuring of  their claims. 
With respect to the Mediterranean region, the loan to Algeria (ECU 400 million), decided 
in 1991, was reactivated in 1994 in the context of  a new economic .prOgramme supported 
by  the  IMF; ·and  the  second  tranche  (ECU  ISO  million)  was  disbursed.  In the  same 
context, a further loan to Algeria for an amount of  up to ECU 200 million was decided in 
late 1994. Again, these initiatives were part of  an international concerted effort to provide 
exceptional  complementary  assistance,  that  involved  bilateral  contributions  of new 
\ 
financing  as  well  as  debt-restructuring  operations  from  Paris  Club  and  London  Club 
creditors. 
Each Community operation has· continued to respond to the set of  principles established in 
1991. ·In particular,  EU  macro-financial  assistance  has  supported  efforts  by  recipient 
· countries ·to bring about economic reforms and structural changes.  In close co-ordination 
with  the  IMF  and  the ·World  Bank,  it  has  promoted  policies  tailored  to  the specific 
national  needs,  designed  to  stabilize the  financial  situation  and  set up  market-oriented 
economies, (macroeconomic performance and progress in reforms in beneficiary countries 
are  summarized  in Tables 4 and  S and  discussed  country  by  country  in the  following 
chapters). 
Towards a more policy-oriented ARProach 
With  the large  geographical  scope  of macro-financial  assistance  operations  initiated  in 
1994,  the  ~o~omic conditions  among  beneficiaries  have  shown  a  great  diversity. 
However,  beyond  these  differences,  the  EU  macro-financial  instrument  has  evolved 
significantly. In particular, in the case of  the CEECs: 
- Macro-financial support has been part of a much broader effort by the EU to comfort 
the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and to establish closer links with 
its neighbouring countries. The framework for that effort has been further clarified; in 
particular,  Association  Agreements  were  signed  in  1991-1995  with  most  of these 
countries. Moreover, a decisive step was taken at Copenhagen, in June 1993, when the 
European  Council  accepted  the  goal  of Union  membership  for  those  associated 
countries and put forward  political and economic measures to create more favourable 
conditions  to this  end.  Macro-financial  assistance,  which  possible  use  was  explicitly 4 
mentioned in the chapter on financial co-operation of  the Association Agreements, was 
therefore  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of a  long-run  partnership  with  the  associated 
countries.  The  European  Council  of Essen  in  December  1994  has  confinned  ~e  . 
conclusions of the European Councils in Copenhagen and  Corfu  that the associated 
States of  Central and Eastern Europe can become members of the European Union if 
they so  desire and  as  soon as  they are able to fulfill  the neces:sarY conditions.  It has 
decided to boost and improve the process of  further preparing tJle associated States of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
- The  achievement  of a successful  transition  towards  a market· economy  increasingly 
appeared  as  a  complex,  protracted  process.  More  ·specifically,  the  necessary  links 
between macroecoro1.0mic  stabilization and  structural adjustment  (and  the need  to  put 
more emphasis on structural reforms) became more obvious. For the IMF, it translated 
into a better integration cf  those aspects into the programmes that were negotiated with 
the authorities of  those countries. In parallel, the World Bank helped the authorities to 
design specific programmes centred around key reforms in the enterprise and financial 
sectors, to be supported by policy-based lending operations with conditionality relating 
to progress with structural reform. 
From the European Union's point of  view, all this has affected the timing and the content 
of the programmes.  EU lending has  evolved towards a more policy-oriented role and  a 
greater  synergy  has  been  achieved  with  grant-based  EU  instruments  (mostly  the  EU-
PHARE- programme).  This  can  be  illustrated  by  the  operations  initiated  in  1994  with 
Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic. 
Macro-economic  imbalances  persisted  and  reform  remained  elusive  in  Bulgaria  and 
Romania throughout 1993. Arrangements concluded in 1992 with the IMF and the World 
Bank  ran  off-track,  and  discussions  on  new  comprehensive  programmes  dragged  on 
during  most  of 1993.  At  the  same  time,  the  newly  independent  Slovak  Republic  was 
experiencing difficulties coping with the huge loss of transfers that it had received under 
the Federation. For those countries, it was therefore important that financial assistance be 
available when a renewed willingness to progress with stabilization and reform emerged. 
This happened  in late  1993-early 1994 when authorities in all three countries decided to 
engage in new comprehensive programmes that could be supported by the international 
community.  The European Union  decided  at  this juncture to  respond  favourably  to  the 
request for further macro-financial assistance in the context of G-24 to complement IMF 
and World Bank arrangements. 
Although the total amounts of resources committed by the G-24 have not been, in relative 
terms,  as large as in the previous operations, the co-ordination between the Commission 
and the Bretton Woods institutions has been more intense. Also the policy dialogue with 
the authorities in the countries concerned has broadened considerably. 
The  dialogue  established  with  the  authorities  in  the  framework  of macro-financial 
assistance involved a two-stage process. 
- In the first stage, the main objective was to concur in the rapid implementation of key 
policy measures at the outset of  the programme. 
- In  the  second  stage,  the  main  objective was  to  assess  the  government's  strategy for 
structural reforin.  Two major fields of investigation were the privatization process and 
the restructuring of the public enterprise sector.  In parallel,  dis~ussions were held with 5 
EU-PHME services with a. view to finding appropriate ways to strengthen the capacity 
of  the rel~t  Dational institutioD.s to. handle these tasks. 
In both ar~  of  stabilization and structural reform, policies have been monitored in close 
co-operation' with the IMP aDd the' World Bank. 
Macro-fiDaDcial uaistanCe to countries Other than asSociated .CBECs hu llso evolved, 
althousJl to a lesser degree.  Operati~  could not be embedded in ~.context of  long-term 
partnership similar to that with ~  countries;  however,. more emphaliJ -has  also -. 
beea put on  structural  refo~. In ·the  case  of Moldova  and  Ukraine,  where  macro-
financial uaistance initiated in 1994 has been supporting efforts at an eArly stage of the 
transition  to  market  economies,  tlie:se  have  included  the  imroduction  of necessary 
legislative framework  as  well  u  the  implementation of important  structural reform,  in 
particular iQ. the ke}r areas of liberalization of foreign trade, introduction of convertibility 
. ·  uid price liberalization (that were ~ed  to be put in place at the beginning of  the decade 
in'most associated CEECs). 
In  Albania, · where  the  first  stage  of economic  stabilization  and  reform  had  been 
5uccessfully achieved, assistance has been supporting the shift by the Albanian authorities 
from a mainly short-term horizon, that had been dictated by the state of crisis, towards a 
consistent medium-term  approach  in  the framework  of a comprehensive  medium-term 
economic programme. In Algeria, resumption of  assistance by the EU has been supporting 
renewed efforts towards the established of a convertible market-based exchange rate, the 
liberalization of trade and  prices and  the tightening of financial  discipline for the state-
't>wned enterprises. 
Burden-Wrina 
While  EU  macro-tin8ncial  assistance  has  been  evolving  toward~ a  deepened  policy-
.  oriented approach, resources mobilized by the Union in this context ~ve  been decreasing 
substantially (Tables 3 and 3.1 ).  Initially, an important feature of EU assistance was that 
very  large  sums  of money  were  to  be  found  to  support  Bretton  Woods  institutions 
progrmunes. The EU played a key role both as the largest single provider of  these funds, 
(mobilizing 54% of  total balance of  payments support to Hungary in 1990) and through its 
role as- the co-ordinator of bilateral assistance (the G-24 proCess for CEECs iince 1991 ). 
which ensured a wide participation in this effort. 
Eventually,  more  resources  were  mobilized  by  the  IFis  (whose  contribution  increased 
from 21% of balance of payments support- excluding debt relief- in  1991  to some 70 
percent in  1994):  a new lending instrument, the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) 
was  ~reated which,  together with the increase  in the access· limits,  enabled the  IMP  to 
increase its assistance to CEECs and  countries of the former  Soviet Union.  The World 
Bank, for its part, developed successive generations of policy-bued balance of payments 
operations (Structural Adjustment loans .. sAL-, followed by Financial and Enterprise and 
Financial Sectors Adjustment loans -EFSAL5). 
5  Most EFSAL operations discussed with beneficiary ~tries  could not be concluded by end-1994 and 
are therefore  not  included  in the  commitments  recorded  in Tables  3  and  3  .1.  When  they  are, 
contribution by the World Bank will increase accordingly. 6 
In parallel, contfibutions by external creditors, both public and private, were mobilized in 
the framework of debt-relief and debt-reduction operations (Algeria, Bulgaria, Ukraine), 
accounting for a substantial share of  balance of  payments support in 1991  and 1994. 
.  . 
In this context, relative· contributions' fi'om the EU and from other bilaterala (beyond debt 
relief operations) declined sharply from 54% and 25%, respectively in 1990 ·to  17% and  ; 
12%, respectively; in 1994 (or 6% lnd 5%, respectively, of  total commitments including  · · 
debt reJlef operations). · 
6  Only the countries for which macro-financial assistance from the EU has been mobilized are covered 
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Talal  2414  11.1  ....  ...  ...  4279.2  81.9  181.0  3261J  1M.I 
407.11  7.11  9.5 I  332.0 I  lUI 
(I)  C  ·s  I' ,..  ... 1992193--.--tabn ialo c-.idonliaa ._the aplntioa hal aat "-impl  zded  • 
(2)  Ia 195111; IIIIC  ·~  't"  are-at~_...._..,.  MECU ._  w11ic11 illllltllba  iNo c-.id ..  tiea ia  111i1 ..W. 
Iince illoatplla  .........  G-24 ..-. 
__________  ... ~ 
·,  Table 3: Balance of payments support to redpieatl of  EU 
macro-financial usistance by contributor, 1990-1994 (1) 
(in percent of  total commitments) 
lpdudjac debt nJjc{ 
1990  1991  1992  . 
1994 
IFrs  11  50  69  17 
IMF  1l  37  40  21 
World Bank  10  13  29  6 
Bilaterals  79  50  31  ..  73 
EU(2)  54  20  19  6 
Other bilaterals (3)  25  13  13  s 
olw  USA  0  0  0  1 
Japan  10  8  5  2 
. Debt relief  0  18  0  63" 
Paris Club  5  32 
London Club  28 
Other (4)  13  2 
Exdudiaa debt relicf 
'~·- .. 
1990  1991  1992  1994 
IFI's  11  61  69  71 
IMF  11  45  .  40  56 
World Bank  10  16  29  15 
Bilaterals  . 79  39  31  19 
EU(2)  54  24  19  17 
Other bilaterals (3)  25.  15  13  12 
o/w  USA  0  ·0  0  . 
2 
Ja)!an  10  9  5  6 
(1)  Based on Council Decisions for  EU operations, except for Bulgaria II. 
No operation was decided in 1993. 
(2)  EU ~financial,assistance. 
(3)  lncludil)g EU member states. 
(4)  Syndicated conuneraal banks loan in favour of  Algeria in 1991, 
debt relief in favour of  Ukraine by Russia and Turkmenistan in 1994. 
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Table 4: Selected economic: indic:aton 
1992  1993  1994 
Programme  (  1)  Estimates 
GDP at c:onltant prices  (Percent change) 
Albania  -9.7  11.0  8.0  7.4 
Algeria  2.2  -1.8  3.0  0.1 
Bulgaria  -7.3  -2.4  0.0  1.4 
Estonia  -19.3  -3.S  6.0  6.0 
Latvia  -35.0  -15.0  2.0 
Lithuania  -37.7  -16.2  2.0 
Moldova  -29.1  -8.7  -3.0  -22.2 
Romania  -13.6  1.3  3A 
Slovak Republic  -7.0  -4.1  0.0  4.8 
Ukraine  -17.0  -17.1  -23.0  -23.0 
Consumer price (ead year)  (Percent change) 
Albania  236.6  30.9  24.0  15.8 
Algeria  31.7  20.5  38.7  29.2 
Bulgaria  79.4  63.8  30.0  121.9 
Estonia  942.0  36.0  42.0 
Latvia  958.0  35.0  26.0 
Lithuania  246.0  163.0  45.0 
Moldova  219S'.O  837.0  123.0  116.0 
Romania  198.5  29S.O  77.0  61.7 
Slovak Republic  9.1  25.1  12.0  11.7 
Ukraine  2000.0  10155.0  276.0  401.0 
Fiscal balance  (Percent of GOP) 
Alba rna  -21.8  -16.0  -16.5  -1-tO 
Algeria  -1.3  -9.2  -5.7  -5.0 
Bulgaria  -15.0  -15.7  -6.2  -6.7 
Estonia  0.2  0.7  0.0 
Latvia  -0.8  0.6  -4.1 
Lithuania  0.5  -5.1  -4.0 
Moldova  -23.4  -6.8  -3.7  -8.1 
Romania  -4.6  ~-· 
-2.5  -2.3 
Slovak Republic  -13.1  -7.6  -4.0  -2.7 
Ukraine  -30.4  -10.1  -9.4  -8.6 Table 4: Selected economic indicaton (coatinued) 
1992  1993  1994 
Proaramme  (1)  f'Aiimates 
r 
~ Carreat accGUDt  (Percent ofGDP)  . 
Albania  -65.7  -33.~  -17.3  -13.5 
Algeria  2.9  2.1  -6.3  -4.2 
. Bulpria  -9.3  -7.9  -5.9  1.0 
Estonia  7.6  0.7  -9.2  -6.4 
Latvia  2.3  6.7  -3.4 
Lithuania  ~:4  -6.2  -S.l 
"MoldoYa  -3.0  -9.3  -12.S  -9.2 
Romaaia  -8.6  -s.5  -3.5  -1.0 
Slovak Republic  0.0 (2)  -5.4  -2.6  6.0 
Ukraine  -3.5  -S.9  -6.8  -6.0 
Ofllclal forelp esclwlae raerves  (Months of  imports) 
(end year) 
Albania  0.7  2.2  3.1  3.3 
Algeria  2.2  2.3  1.8  2.9 
Bulgaria  3.5  2.4  2.7  3.5 
Estonia  4.5  4.8  4.3 
Latvia  2.0  4.4  4.6 
Uthuania  2.6  2.4  2.3 
Moldov&  0.0  1.5  1.0  3.1 
Romania  0.2  0.1  1.1  1.1 
Slovak Republic  0.5  0.6  1.3  2.4 
Ukraine  0.2  0.6 
(I)  Programme targets as set in: July 93 (and revised in Aug 94) for Albania, May 94 for Algeria, 
April 94 for Bulgaria. Dec 93 (and revised in May 94) for Moldova. May 94 for Romania, 
July 94 for SIO\'&kia, October 94 for Ukraine. 
(2)  After fiscal transfers from the Czech lands, estimated at about 7% of Slovak GOP. 
Sources: National authorities ·.  \ 
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TABLES 
STATUSOFECONO~CREFORM 
S.l ALBANIA 
1.  ·  Price liberalization  Most  price  caatrolJ  .  and  subsidies  eliminated,  with  the 
exception of energy. Baqy prices adjulted m  order to reach 
progressively the cost covering level 
2.  Trade liber&Iization 
3. 
4.  Foreign direct investmalt 
Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
1. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
No  quantitative  restrictiolls  on  imports.  Export  restrictiaas 
limited to scrap metals. 
Free float since 1uly 1992 within a unified exchanp marbt. 
Early  licensing  of fOreign  excbange  dealers  and  exchange 
bureaux.  Current  account  convertibility.  Apement  in 
principle  on  the  largo  external  debt  arrears  to  commercial 
baDlcs reached in May 1995. 
Liberal  legislation.  Draft  law  on  liberalization of land  sale 
recently presented to the Parliament. 
Use  of bank-by-bank  credit  ceilings.  Interest  rates  are  set 
administratively  to  CllSW'e  that they  remain  positive  in real 
terms.  Treasury bill auctions (3, 6, 12 months). 
VAT  introduction  approved  in  late  1995.  Removal  of tariff 
exemptions,  new  classification,  new ·tariff rates  approved  in 
May  1995.  Revenue:  28%  of GDP  in  1994.  Expenditure 
shifting away from subsidies and social bcndits toward public 
investment. 
96  % of total  arable  land  privatized.  Distribution  of titles 
completed in May 1995. Draft laws to facilitate the emerpnee 
of a land market (May 1995). Small privatization in trade and 
~  completed.  Industrial  enterprises:  privatization  of 
small and medium-sized enterprises  largely compleled;  mixed 
progress with biggest state-owned enterprises. Draft laws on a 
mass privatization scheme (March 1995). 
Two-tier  banking  system.  Three  existina  state-owned  banks 
still to be restructured, and their non-perfouniug loans replaced 
by  government  bonds.  Audits  due  to  start  in  1995. 
Streamlining of licensing procedures envisaged to facilitate the 
entry  of new  private  banks.  Important  informal  banking 
system. 
'': .. · 
... 
·. 
I.  Price h'beralizatian 
2.  Tndc liberalization 
IS 
5.lALGERIA 
Price liberalisation is proecectiq padually, with pusap of 
goods frcm strict price CCDtroll to· ccxitrols on profit maqiDs 
only 8lld fiDally to ccmpletety free pricel.  Public utilities IDd 
buic staple foods  remain  UDder  caatro1,  but with  subsidies 
beiDa pbued out progreaiwly. 
Imports haw  been fully liberalilecl," apart Com goods subject to 
health, Rliaious and security cbecb. A registration ICbaDe for 
importers, based on profasioaal criteria, will be abolished in 
the course of  1995. LepliDd de facto state import moaopolies 
are rapidly being eliminated. 
FollowiDg a 400A. devaluation of the Dinar in April  1994, the 
foreign  excbaDge  allocation  system  bu been  mbstantially 
liberalised and foreip exchanp is now available for all boDa 
fide imports by enterprises. Switch from fixed to IIWIIged float 
exchange rate but contim•ing 1arp difrereDce between oflicial 
and  parallel  markets  rates..  Convertibility  of the  Dinar  for 
~  account trallsactions is expected to be· reached in the 
counc of 1996.  · 
4.  Foreign direct investment  A  liberal  foreign  investment  rqimc,  includiDg  the  baDking 
sector,  was  adopted  in  19~3.  But  no  sipificant  foreign 
investments have taken place in view of  the leCUrity situation. 
S.  Monetary policy  Interest  rates have  increased in 1994 but remain negative  in 
real terms. A cap  on the margin between debtor aDd creditor 
rates limits profitability and compditioq in the banking sector. 
6.  Public finances  The public sector deficit has been reined in from 9.2% ofGDP 
in  1993  to S%  in  1994, mainly through strict wap. controls 
and reductions in subsidies. 
7.  ·  Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
8.  Financial sector refonn 
Most state-owned enterprises have received autonomous status 
and arc now controlled by several  State  Participation Funds. 
The  remaining  23  non-autonomous  enterprises  will undergo 
financial  restructuring before  bcaxning autonomous,  by end 
1995. A pilot hotel privatization prosramme bas been launched 
and a privatization law is in preparation. 
Banks are state-owned and have developed -very little private 
sector  credit  activities.  Short  of privatization, ~ 
contracts  are  proposed  for  1995.  Prudential  replatioas  and 
banking supervision arc being set up, in the wake of  extensive 
banking audits. 
., 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Price liberalisation 
Trade hberalisation 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector reform 
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5.3 BULGARIA 
At present some 90% of  all mail tumover taka place under a 
free  price  regime.  Price  controls  still  maintained  011  some 
public services (CDmJY, teleconunUnicatiODJ, water supply and 
traDsports). In these sectors prices mnain below cost. In April 
1994 a ucw, temporary price "moDitoring" bas been introduced 
on some basic food items. 
Export prohibitions have been removed (temporary exception: 
grain, till Sept.94). Average ~rt  tariff on industrial goods: 
22%.  Some  import  protection  measures  are  still  in  place. 
Interim and trade Agrecmants with EU and EFT  A eutered into 
force on Jan.l, 1994. 
Since  1991,  unified  and  quasi-free  floating  exchange  rate 
regime. Internal current account convertibility established (few 
restrictions). Limited BNB interventions in support of  the lev. 
Official (Paris Club) debt rescheduling reached in April 1994. 
This was followed by the  finalization of DDSR Arrangement 
with (London Club) commercial creditors in July. 
Liberal  foreign  inveStment  legislation adopted  in early  1992. 
Small amounts of foreign investment so far recorded owing to 
external  debt  problems,  policy  slippages · and  political 
uncertainty. 
Bank credit ceilings  were  discontinued in mid-1994.  In  1994 
monetary  and  credit  indicators  used  as  nominal  anchor. 
Limited open market operations in 1994. 
New rules on taX adminiJtration adopted in 1994. VAT entered 
into  force  in  April,  same  year.  Rcvmuc/GDP  ratio in  1994: 
38.1%-budget deficit/GOP ratio: 6.7. 
Property  restitution  programme  well  advanced.  A  financial 
rescue  plan  for  enterprises  was  initiated  in  1994.  Mass 
privatization  programme  (involving  SOO  enterprises) 
postponed.  Standard,  market-based  privatization  proceeded 
only slowly. 
In 1994 banking supervision strengthened. Bank consolidation 
programme  carried  out  by  Bank  Consolidation  Company 
almost·  completed.  Clean  up  operations  and  bank 
recapitalization  proceeded  slowly  in  1994.  Stock  exchange 
introduced and developing slowly. 1.  Price h'beralisation 
2.  . Trade liberalisation 
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5.4 ESTONIA 
Major  price  liberalisation  in· 1991.  Since  end  1992,  virtual 
completion of  price liberalisation, inclading in cmerzy sector. 
In  early  1992,  abolition  of most  import  tarij& (except  few 
luxury goods),  and  of most  remaiDiDa  quoSiis·  aDd  licaasing 
requiremalts except for oil shale, clay, quartz.:  hnport subject 
to a 0.5% administrative  fee  plus  18% VAT.  Few  exports 
tariffs. Free trade agreement with Baltic iad N'ordic countries. 
Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. 
3.  Exchange regime  Current account  convertibility.  Since  1992,  Estonian  Kroon 
pegged to the DM, at a rate of  eight kroons to one DM, under a 
currency board system. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents 
5.  Monetary policy  Central  bank  responsible  for  operation  of currency  board 
.(Issue Department)  and, in exceptional cases,  for  emergency 
··tending to banking  system  (Banking Department,  responsible 
for  managing  reserves  in  excess  of currency  board  cover). 
Central. Bank  does  not  interfere  with  the  commercial  banks' 
setting of  interest rates, 
6.  Public finances  General government revenue:  35% of GDP.  Personal income 
tax and  VAT  introduced  in  1991,  turnover tax replaced  by 
corporate  income  tax;  social  security,  natural  resource  and 
spcci!ic excise taxes. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise  BankruptCy  law  enacted  in  1992.  Almost  completed  small-
restructuring  scale privatization (about 1,500 SMEs privatized). Enactment 
of the  Privatisation  Law  and  establishment  of the  Estonian 
Privatisation  Office  in  1993  to  accelerate  the  privatization 
process.  Wide  distribution  of  vouchers,  large-scale 
privatization accelerated in 1994 (258 enterprises privatized by 
year..end). 
8.  Financial sector reform  Two-tier  banking  system.  Increased  pressure  on  state 
enterprises to restructure through bard budget constraints and 
selective  application  of the  bankruptcy  law.  Reduction  of 
number of  commercial banks from 40 to 24 through increase in 
minimum  capital  requirement  following  a  bankinJ  crisis  in  . 
Winter 92193. Stock exchange introduced. Recent enactment of  • 
Credit  Institutions  Act  enhanced  supervision  and  prudential 
regulation powers of  Central Bank. •  18 
S.SLATVIA 
1.  Price h"beralisatian  Since  ead-1992,  price .liberalisation  eu-rtial1y  campleted, 
excludiug utility prices IDd rmts. 
2.  Trade 1iberalilation  All  export ~  aDd  liccasiDg  llld  most  export  tariffs 
abolilbed in 1992. No liccasiDg requiremeats for imports, but 
various import tariffs. Free trade aareemenP with Baltic States 
and Nordic~. 
3.  Exclumge regime.  Cumm  account  convertibility.  ·Exchange  rate  unified. 
Exchange  rate  of lats  stabilised  under  manapd  floating 
system, informally peaed to the SDR. 
4.  Foreign direct inwstment  Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
S.  Monetary policy  Independent  central  bank.  Strict monetary  policy resulted  in 
lowest inflation rate II1\0Di Baltic States. Credit policy through 
indirect instruments. 
6.  Public finances  General government revenue:  36% of GDP.  New tax system 
since  January  1991.  VAT  introduced  in  February  1992.  In 
1993  replacement of progressive incame tax by flat rate tax 
(2S%)  plus  a  10%  surcharge  on  annual  income.  Sale  of 
treasury bills to finance general government budget deficit. 
7.  Privatisation and enteiprise 
restructuring 
8.  .  Financial sector refonn 
Substantial progress on small-scale privatization. Privatisation 
agency established in 1994. Large-scale privatization delayed. 
pending settlement of property rights issues, until auctions of 
68  large  enteiprises  launched  in  November  1994.  Large 
distribution  of vouchers,  including  for  land  and  housing 
privatization.  State  enterprises  not  ready  for  inunCdiate 
privatization transformed into stock compaDies, to be managed 
by a State Property Fund established in 1994.  Slow progress 
on liquidation. 
Two-tier  banking  system.  Former  branches  of the  Bank  of 
Latvia  either  merged,  now  fonning  the  Universal  Bank,  or 
privatized,  except  for  one  which  was  liquidated.  Capital 
adequacy ratio increased in  January  1994.  Balance sheets  of 
Universal  Bank  of Latvia  and  of Latvian  Savings  Bank 
recently strengthened. However,  financial system fragile.  Nine 
bank licences  withdrawn in  1994.  Crisis of Baltija Bank,  the 
main  commercial  bank  in  Latvia.  Stock  exchange  already 
introduced. 
.. 1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Pric;e liberalisation 
!  . 
Trade liber8lisation 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector reform 
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5.6 LITHUANIA 
Price  liberalisation  in  1991,  1992  and  1993.  Level  of 
subsidisation reduced for household heating (prices raised 50% 
in October  1994),  electricity  (prices  raised  33% in October 
1994), and transport. 
Export quotas·and liccming completely removed in June 1993. 
All  import  controls  and  licenses  removed.  Since  May  1994 
import tariffs  for  a  broad  range of goods,  representing  two 
thirds of  imports, suppressed. In 1994 import tariffs on several 
agricultural  goods  raised  to  average  30%  in  October.  Free 
Trade Agreement  with  EU  entered  into  force  on  1 January 
1995. 
Current account convertibility. Since April 1994, Litas pegged 
to US dollar at a fixed rate four litas to one dollar. 
Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
New central bank law enacted in December 1994.  Since April 
1994,  currency  board  arrangement,  according  to  which  the 
money  in  circulation  is  limited  to  the  amount  of foreign 
exchange held in the central bank. 
General government  revenue:  24%  of GDP.  The  tax system 
was  refonned  and  now  includes  personal  income  and  profit 
taxes,  property  tax,  natural  resource  tax,  individual  excise 
taxes,  as  well  as  general  sales  tax.  New  value  added  tax 
replacing previous general excise tax. 
Bankruptcy law enacted in 1992. Substantial progress on small 
and  large-scale privatization through  auctions~ public  shares 
subscriptions and voucher system.  By January  1994, 76% of 
all  companies  eligible for  privatization  (1/3  of state capital) 
privatized. Little progress on land privatization. 
Two-tier banking system since  1992.  State Commercial Bank  · 
taking  over  commercial  functions  of Bank  of  Lithuania. 
Commercial  banking  act enacted  in  early  1995.  Three  main 
state-owned banks  currently audited.  Stock exchange  already 
introduced. 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Price liberalization 
Trade liberalization 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
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5.7MOLDOVA 
Liberalization  of  prices,  goods  and  services  with  some 
exceptions (mainly energy products and cereals). 
All  export quotas  removed  with the  exception  of grain and 
grain products. Maximum import tariff lowered to SO% by end 
94, to 30% by end March 95, and to be lowered to 20 % by 
end November 1995. 
Ne* currency  introduced  in  November  93.  Freely  floating. 
Daily interbank  foreign  exchange  auctions.  Current aecOunt 
convertibility. 
Liberal  regime:  free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of 
liquidation  of investments  within  the  three  months  of the 
closure. 
Relying on credit ceilings.  Key objective:  rapid and sustained 
reduction of inflation, based on introduction of new currency, 
enforced  financial  discipline  and  enhanced  central  bank 
independence. New draft banking law to be adopted shortly by 
Parliament,  providing  independence  of National  Bank  in. 
conducting monetary policy. 
VAT since  1993. Tax collection impeded by important barter 
trade,  predominance  of  cash  transactions  and  liquidity 
problems in enterprise sector.  Assumption by the government 
of guaranteed  loans  to enterprises  in default  to  be  strictly 
limited in 1995. Ratio revenue/GOP:  16.9%. 
Delay in the 1993/94 'Privatisation Programme, but important 
acceleration  during  the  last  months  of 1994  (25%  of State 
assets  privatized  by  end  94).  New  programme  for  95/96 
adopted in March 95, by which 2/3  of State assets should be 
privatized by end 1996. Diversification of  privatization process 
in the  new  programme,  compared  to 93/94  progr;ulune  only 
based  on  vouchers- (patrimonial  bonds).  Under  present 
bankruptcy  law,  more· than  90  private  enterprises  already 
liquidated and bankruptcy proceedings initiated against 7 state 
enterprises. 
Two-tier  banking  system.  National  Bank  working  on  new 
regulations to meet standards set up  by the  Basle Committee. 
New  regulation  imposing  provisions  for  bad  loans  recently 
approved. 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
6. 
.  7. 
8. 
Priri·liberalisation 
'rrade liberalisation 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
•, 
Mondary policy 
Public finances 
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5.8ROMANIA 
Completed in May  1993.  EDersY prices remain controled but 
adjusted  regularly for cbaoges in intematioaal  prices.  Public 
utilities  aDd some basic staple food prices  still controled aDd 
subsidised. 
Fully  h"beralised.  A  limited  number  of  import/export 
•  quota/baDs  is still in force,  either  for health  reasons  or for 
subsidised goods. Europe agreaDeDt with the EU in force since 
1 February 1995. MFN status in the·us·. 
Limited  current  account  convertibility.  A  market-based 
exchange  rate  regime  was  established  in  April  1994  but 
multiple exchange rates persist. Foreign exchange available to 
individuals through private exc:haDge bureaus. 
Free  legal  environment  for  equity  participation  and  profits 
repatriatim by non-residents. Lack of progress with respect to 
privatization bas limited the volume of  invcstinent inflows. 
The Central Bank uses both direct 8nd indirect instruments for 
monetarY policy management.  Positive real interest rates have 
· strengthened confidence in the Leu.  Central Bank financing of 
Treasury deficits has almost ceased. Weak financial discipline 
of  state companies. 
Good  progress  with  fiscal  reforms  and  introduction  of new 
taxation systems, including VAT. Overhaul of  the income tax 
system is expected by end 1996. Fiscal deficit is relatively low 
and under control. 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Little  progress  with  medium- and  large  scale  enterprises 
privatization through the State OWnership Fund.  Some succes 
with  smaU:-scale  privatization through  buy-outs.  Large  inter-
enterprise  arrears  hamper  financial  restructuring  of  loss 
makers.  Private sector about a third ofGDP. 
Financial sector refonn  Two-tier  banking  system.  Several  foreign  banks  already 
operational.  Clearing  of interbank  payments  and  transfers 
remains  very  slow.  Very little  progr~s with  privatization of 
fonncr state-owned banks. 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
22 
5.9 THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Price liberalization 
Trade liberalization 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector reform 
96% of  total turnover based on tree prices, with rqpdation still 
in force  in the areas  of energy,  public transportation,  rents, 
telephone, telegraph and ~cal  products. 
Imports liberalized except for a few seasitive ittms subject to 
import liCCDCel. Export li~  remains for a limited number 
of products.  Free trade agreements  ·with the EC,  the  EFT  A. 
countries  and  the Visegrad  countries.  Customs  union  with 
Czech  Republic  since  dissolution  of the  CSFR.  A  10% 
temporary surcharge on consumer imports  was  intioduced in 
March 1994. 
Current account convertibility almost completed in early 1991. 
Exchange rate pegged to a basket of  Western Currencies since 
February 1993. Transactions with Czech Republic conducted 
through a  clearing  system at a different  exchange  ~- The 
authorities plan to reach full current accowrt convertibiltiy by 
1 January  1996.  This  will  involve  tcnnination  of clearing 
system with Czech Republic 
No  limits  on  equity  participation  in  enterprises  by  non-
residents,  except  in the  case  of a  few  sensitive  or  defmcc-
rclatcd sectors. Free repatriation· of  profits and proceeds from 
the liquidation of  investment. 
National  Bank  of Slovakia,  established  in  January  1993, 
operates  independently  ftom  government.  Slovak  crown 
introduced  in  February  1993.  Individual  credit  ceilings  on 
banks reintroduced in March 1994. 
VAT  reformed,. excise  tax system  and  personal  income  tax 
introduced  in  January  1993.  General  govemmcnt  revenues 
estimated at 50.6% of  GOP in 1994. 
First wave  of large  scale  privatization completed  by  Spring 
1993.  Second  wave,  under  preparation,  will  emphasize 
traditional  privatization  methods  (direct sales,  tenders,  etc.). 
Sccorld  scheme  of voucher  privatization to be completed  by 
mid-1996.  Bankruptcy law came into effect in June  1993 but 
few companies have filed for bankruptcy. 
Two-tier banking system established in January  1990.  Major 
financial institutions privatized under first wave of large-scale 
privatization. But State Savings Bank and biggest commercial 
bank  (VUB)  remain  state<ontrollcd.  Since  1991,  several 
measures to strengthen banks' balance-sheets. Bratislava Stock 
Exchange in operation since 1993 but financial markets remain 
underdeveloped.  Stricter  rules  for  classification  and 
provisioning ofbad loans introduced in March 1995. .  . 
1.  Price. h"benlization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
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5.10~1~ 
Limits on profit marains abolisbed.  Price regulatim limited to 
Datural aod a small nUmber of·artific.ial moaopolies. Fun cost 
of imported  euergy  passed  on  tO  indastrial  aDd  aariculbual 
users.  Slwp increues in coal,  electricity, gas, triDsportatian 
aDd housiDg prices for houebolds. 
System of state Orden abolished.  1995 budget allocations for 
state procurement of agricultural products limited to needs of 
budgetary organizations. At least half  oftblle priced by tender 
or through commodity exdumges. 
Import  regime  free  of quantitative  restrictions,  with  few 
exceptions primarily for health aod safety reasons.  Maximum 
import tariff  lowered to 30o/o. Elimination of  all export quotas 
and licences  except for quotas  on grain. Auction· mechanism 
for allocating externally imposed quotas initiated. 
3.  Foreign exd1a.agc regime  Abolition of  official eX.c:lumge rate and unification of exchange 
rate determined  at interbank auction market.  High dcgrcc  of 
current account convertibility reinstated.  Managed floating of 
the exchange rate of  the karbovanet:s. 
:~ 
4.  . Foreign direct investment  Decree of  May 1993 grants tax relief (exemption from inCome 
and profit tax for 5 years) for certain inwstments constituting 
at least 20% of  a enterprise's charter capital. 
5.  Monetary policy  Allocation of all Central Bank credit to commercial banks by 
auction.  No  more  directed  credits  issued.  Central  Bank 
refinance rate adjusted to ensure that it remains positive in real 
terms. 
6.  Public finances 
7. 
8. 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector reform 
Since J992 gradual tightening  and  rationalization of budget 
including  refonn  of VAT,  enterpriSe  and· income  taxes. 
Reduction of public expenditure from  72% in% of GOP  in 
1992 to some 50% in 1994. 
Ratio revenudGDP: 44.3% in 1994. 
Mass voucher privatization prosramme launched at bcginaing 
of 1995.  SQme 400 mcdi\un and  large enterprises privatized. 
Progress with·small-scale privatization. Decision to close some 
15  loss-making  coal  minos.  Bankruptcy  procedures  being 
simplified in 1995.  . 
Central bank law submitted to Parliament. Plans to strengthen 
supervision  and  regulation  of the  banking  sector.  Study  in 
preparation  on  rcstructuriDg  of portfolio  of non-performing 
loans of  largest banks, and auditing in process. Prolit tax for 
bankS reduced to 40%.  . • ••  .  .  24 
n.  ALBANIA 
1.  Introduction 
Albania's macroeconomic and structural adjustment efforts were initiated in 1m  aP.nst a 
background of  severe economic,  social and administrative dislocation.  The government's  . 
decisive  efforts to address  the" crisis when it assumed  office  in April 1m  have been .. 
largely successful.  The economic programme for  the  period.mid-l~mid~1993; wb!ch . 
was supported by an IMP staDd-by· arrangement and com.plementarj financial assistance 
from EC7 (ECU 70 million in the form of  a grant) and bilateral G-24 members, reversed 
the slide into hyperinflation and the downward  spiral of output,  and initiated profound 
changes· towards a IIIAI1cet economy.  Against this background,  the ·Albanian authorities 
could shift from a mostly short-term horizon towards a consistent medium-term approach 
when they embarked on a three-year comprehensive arrangement with the IMF UDder an 
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF)  in  mid-1993  (US$  60  million).  In 
support of  this IMP programme, the Council ofMinisters decided on 28 November 19948 
to grant Albania further macro-financial assistance of  up to ECU 35 million ·in the form of 
straight grants in  the context of .an  initiative  of the Group  of Twenty-Four aiming  at 
mobilizing a total of  US$ 72 million. 
Albania has been successfully implementing the economic adjustment efforts contemplated 
in  the  first  and  second  annual  arrangements  under  the  ESAF.  A number  of structural 
reforms  fell  behind  schedule  during  1994.  The  Albanian  government,  however,  has. 
recently taken new initiatives to accelerate structural adjustment. 
2.  Mac1'9ec:onomic performance 
Macroeconomic performance during.  1994 was very satisfactory.  Inflation in the twelve 
months  to December was  reduced  to  some  1  S percent,  compared  with  a programme 
target of 24 percent. Output is estimated to have continued to grow at a sustained pace 
(some 7 1/2 percent, following  11  percent in 1993), led by private activity in agriculture, 
construction  and  service  sectors.  The  external  current  account  performed  better than 
programmed, owing in particular to export buoyancy and sustained private transfers. This 
successful macroeconomic outturn reflected the maintenance of  tight fiscal and monetary 
policies; in particular, the targeted domestic financing of  the budget deficit was contained 
at 8 percent of  GDP. External reserves remained above programmed levels. 
Based on this performance, the Albanian government and the IMF have recently agreed 
on  a macroeconomic  framework  and  the  main  features  of the  budget  for  1995:  the 
objectives include real GDP growth of 6 percent,  a reduction in inflation to  10 percent 
(December/December)  and  a further  increase  in  external  reserves.  To  this  end,  a key 
policy instrument is the reduction in the government domestic financing requirement to no 
more than 7 percent ofGDP. 
To  achieve  this  budget  objective,  the  government  has  decided  at  end-January  to 
implement a new fiscal package that includes the elimination of  customs tariff exemptions. 
7  Council Decision of  28 September 1992 (92/482/EC). 
8  Council Decision of  28 November 1994 (94n731EC). 
\ w •  •  . 
Furthermore, -the  authorities agreed to introduce the VA  'J  in  mid-1995  to replace the 
existing turnover tax; to introduce a simplified customs tariff rate system,  and to further 
reduce civil service employment.  · 
These policies  are expected  to further  improve  external  accounts;·  ~owing for  some 
additional build up of  reserves (before debt rescheduling). Furthermore, with regard to the 
status of negotiations with external  ~editors, the authorities have recently reached  an 
agreement on external arrears  (of some US$ 500 million,  excluding interest) with the 
banks' advisory committee. 
Exports still  cover only a  fraction of  ~port needs.  Ho:wever,  reflecting th6  exodus of 
young unskilled labour to neighbouring countries (mostly Greece),  expatfi~te remittances 
account for a  significant fraction of national income and largely outweigh ·exports as a 
source of  foreign exchange (US$ 230-260 million a year against US$ 110-140 million in 
1993-94).  In the circumstances,  they  have  helped  maintain a  stable exchange rate and 
finance the incipient private sector (mostly trade and construction) including through the 
development  of an informal  financial  sector.  Current  account  deficit  declined  sharply 
(from 66% of GDP in 1992 to 13.5% in  1994), but Albania still relies heavily on public· 
external financing in particular to meet its investment needs in its infrastructure projects. 
3.  Structural reforms 
The early liberalization of prices, foreign trade and the exchange rate regime have been 
major  achievements of Albania's  government in  recent years.  Most price controls  and 
subsidies were eliminated in 1992-1993. For bread and energy, the government decided to 
cushion  the  social  impact  of  those  measures  by  the  introduction  of  a  targeted 
compensation scheme, to be phased out within a limited period. With regard to energy, 
the price adjustment resulted in a drop of bill collection together with a sizeable increase 
in "non-technical losses" (thefts), dramatic power cuts at the end of 1994, and the need to 
resort to power imports. 
Foreign trade has been largely liberalized: there are no quantitative restrictions on imports; 
on the export side,  licensing is  only required for  a very limited  number of goods.  The 
exchange rate has been floating  since ·July  1992 within a unified  exchange market,  the 
efficiency and depth of  which has been greatly improved by the early licensing of  foreign 
exchange dealers at'ld exchange bureaux (with PHARE technical assistance to the Central 
Ban~.  ·· 
Dramatic changes have taken place in the agriculture sector, following the privatization of 
former co-operatives' land and the liquidation of former state farms.  Some 96% of total 
arable land  is  now reported· to be in private hands and  agricultural output has bounced 
back (increasing by 14  and·~7 percent in  1993  and  1994,  respectively).  However, land 
registration is far from complete and the distribution of temporary titles of property has 
come to a halt since mid-1994; furthermore, the recipients offoimer state farm land have 
only a status of
11users
11  ofthat land; and the small size ofprivate plots (1¥2 ha on average) 
is  an obstacle to further productivity gains,  while the consolidation of those strips into 
larger units is prevented by the lack of  an effective land market. 
Privatisation of small shops and of  the public housing sector was implemented quickly in 
1992,  through  d'rect  sales  to  employees  and  tenants  at  token  prices.  Following  the 
passage  of -legislation  on  restitution  and  compensation  in  early -1993,  the  authorities 
proceeded  with  the  privatization  of small  and  medium  sized  enterprises,  through  a ..  .  26 
decentralized  procedure,  under  the responsibility  of local  authorities.· At present,  the 
process is largely completed and has allowed these small-scale enterprises to remain in 
operation  and  to  stimulate  private  activities.  Concerning  the  biggest  state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), progress so far bas been mixed; with an obsolete capital stock, clearly, 
·large sections of  industry are· no longer viable and cannot operate on commercial terms 
now ~  budgetary support has. been severely reduced;  furthermo~e, the·  adoiinistration 
~ does not  ;have the capacity to cany out a large scale restructuring, and there is no tradition 
and expmence of  export-oriented production and marke~g. 
Banking ·sector reform made little progress in 1994. The three, specialized,  state-owned 
banks (the Savings Bank for household deposits, the ~atibnal Commercial Bank (NCB) 
for  the  enterprise  sector,  and  the Rural  Commercial ·Bank  (RCB)  for  the  agriculture 
sector) are still burdened with bad loans despite previous attempts at cleaning up those  · 
debts. In fact,  both NCB and RCB are virtually bankrupt, while the Savings Bank is not 
fully autonomous from the central bank. In the circumstances, a strategy has_ not yet been 
designed for  each of those banks.  Meanwhile, informal banking activity has developed. 
This informal sector seems to have been effective and  helpfu~ even though its interest 
rates are reported to be very high.  -
In early 1995, the government of Albania bas taken a series of measures and made new 
commitments to remedy the situation in different areas. 
Concerning  the  agriculture  sector,  the government  has  taken the  measures  needed  to 
establish  an  effective  land  market,  including  completing  the  land  registration  and  the 
distribution of "tapis" (temporary titles), as well as the conversion of "user" ·status into 
that of  lessee. 
In  the  area  of  privatization  and  enterprise  sector  reform,  specific  measures  are 
contemplated in the three categories of large enterprises (the most problematic sensitive 
enterprises, public utilities and resource-based enterprises, and other enterprises): 
-the first  group  is  made  up  of 32  SOEs  under  the  responsibility  of the Enterprise 
Restructuring  Agency  (ERA);  the government  has  set  clear  objectives  in  terms  of 
privatization or liquidation (the latter requires new legislation); it has also singled out a 
group of  S enterprises which account for about half of  ~e  total number of  employees in 
ERA enterprises, for which an explicit strategy is to be adopted soon. 
- regarding public utilities and resource-based enterprises, where very little was done in 
1994,  the  government  has  recently  prepared  draft  legislation  in  order  to  allow  an 
eventual privatization of  those enterprises. 
-for the  "other  enterprises",  the  government's  objective  is  to  have  them  privatized 
rapidly including through a mass privatization scheme. However, special attention will 
be devoted to the necessity not to hamper strategic foreign investment in the process. 
No strategy has. yet emerged for the future of  the three state-owned banks. Business plans 
are  being  prepared,  but. their  scope ·  is  essentially  limited  to  the  rationalization  of the 
management of the banks_.:More  substance is  expected from  the results of the external 
audits that are due to start soon. Then it would be possible to adopt a strategy for those 
banks.  Also,  licensing procedures are to be streamlined in  order to facilitate the entry of 
new banks,  and  pbssibly the registration of part of the .  current informal,  underground, 
banking sector. . 
' 
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Meanwhile,  the Central Bank is  striving  to  improve  its  capacity  and  effectiveness,- in 
particular tru:ough the establishment of  instruments of  monetary policy that would allow it 
to go beyond the reliance on bank-by-bank credit ceilings.  · 
4.  .  Implementation of  macro-financial assistance 
On 28 November 1994, as mentioned above, the Council of Ministers adopted a further 
macro-financial assistance to Albania up to a maximum amount of  ECU 35  million.  This  . 
grant is  complementary  to  assistance  provided  by  the  IMF  under  a  3-year Enhanced 
_Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) initiated in  mid-1993,  with a view to ensuring a 
sustainable balance of payments  situation and  strengthening the reserve position of the 
country. 
The first  tranche (ECU  15  million)  of this  assistance was disbursed  in  May,  following 
signature of  the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) laying down the macroeconomic 
and structural conditionality attached to the assistance. 
The disbursement of  the second tranche is expected to take place later this year, subject to 
satisfactory progress being recorded in Albania's application of  the ESAF and to a positive 
evaluation  of progress  made  with  respect  to  structural  reforms.  In  this  evaluation, 
particular attention will be paid to progress in the fields  of liberalization,  external debt, 
budgetary reform, public investment, enterprise and banking sectors, and agriculture. . 
•  '  .  ..:· .  . 
.: 
m.  ALGERIA 
1.  Introduction 
In September 1991, the Council decided to grant an ECU 400 million loan to Algeria, to 
be disbursed in two tranches'.  The loan agreement and the corresponding Memorandum 
of Understanding specifying the conditions for disbursement,  were signed in December 
1991.  The first  tranche  of ECU 250  million  was  immediately  released  as  the two 
conditions  attached  to it  - conclusion of a  Stand-by  agreement  with  the  IMF  and  a 
commercial  debt  refinancing  and  re  profiling  agreement  between  Algeria  and  its 
'commercial bank creditors - were met. 
In accordance with the Memorandum of  Understanding, the release of  the second tranche 
ofECU 150 million was subject to two sets of  conditions:  (a) respect of  the quantitative 
macroeconomic performance criteria agreed in the context of  the IMF programme and (b) 
a positive assessment by the Commission of  the progress accomplished in specific areas of 
structural reform.  However, by mid-1992,  the programme with the IMF had gone off-
track and the macroeconomic performance criteria were not complied with. 
A new-government came to pQwer that halted most of  the economic reform programmes 
and  reversed  some of the liberalisation measures taken.  Throughout  1993,  strict price 
controls, administrative imports management and a stringent foreign currency allocations 
regime choked  economic activity.  The appreciation of the real  exchange rate and  lax 
fiscal  policy  increased the  fiscal  deficit.  Towards the  end  ~f the year,  the decline  in 
hydrocarbon  exports  revenue  led  to  unsustainable  pressure  on  Algeria's  debt  service 
capacity. 
In this context, negotiations started with the IMF at the end of 1993, which resulted in the 
approval of a 12-month Stand-By arrangement10  for an amount of approximately US$  I 
billion in May.  In June, Algeria, for the first time, obtained an agreement from the Paris 
Club on a rescheduling of  bilateral debt service due during the programme period with the 
IMF.  Furthermore, the programme received financial support from the World Bank, the 
Arab  Monetary Fund,  the African Development Bank and  Japan.  The authorities also 
addressed  a request to the Commission  for  the  rapid  release  of the remaining  second 
tranche of the 1991  assistance package as well  as for further macro-financial assistance 
under the new programme. 
2.  Macro-economic performance 
Since  the adoption of the  new  economic  programme,  progress  has  been made  in  the 
stabilisation of the economy and the implementation of economic reforms.  The Algerian 
Dinar was devalued by some 45% and the fixed  exchange rate regime was replaced by a 
managed float, aiming at a stabilisation of  the real effective exchange rate. Prices, imports 
and  access to foreign  currency were substantially  liberalised.  Consumer subsidies  have 
been  gradually  reduced  and  a  more  effective  social  safety  net  is  being  put  in  place. 
9  Decision 91/510/EEC of23 September 1991. 
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Financial  discipline  for  state-owned  enterprises  has  been  tightened  and  the  first  steps 
· towards privatization have been taken.  ·  ·  ·  · 
.  The fiscal deficit dropped from 9.2% ofGDP in 1993 to ·S% in 1994 and the 199S Budget 
law is targeted at a :20.4  deficit.  Monetary policy was ·tightened ·and  interest rates were 
increased, although not yet at positive levels in real terms. Despite the strong devaluation 
and  a ·series of price adjustments, .  inflation increased  moderately from  21% in  1993  to 
29% in 1994 and monthly inflation is expected not to exceed a 10% anm1al rate. by the end 
of  1995. Economic growth, however, has not picked up as foreseen under~  progrimlne 
with  ~e· IMF.  GDP growth for  1994 was revised downwardi from 3% to arounc;t  zero, 
partly attributahle to a drought affecting agricultural production but· also to political and 
security  problems  which  may,  if ~  trend  is  not  reversed,·  hampCi:r  the  proper 
implementation of  the economic reform programme.  · 
Export revenue,  mostly from hydrocaibon products, further declined in 1994, in spite of 
an increase in world oil prices.  Imports increased by. 1  5% following the liberalisation of 
the import and foreign exchange regimes.  Shortages of consumer and investment goods 
have been eliminated. As a result of  these liberalizations, the current account deteriorated, 
as foreseen under the programme, from a US$ 0.8 billion surplus in  1993  to a US$  1.7 
billion deficit  in  1994 and  the overall balance of payments  registered a US$  4.4 billion 
deficit in the same year. This h~  been financed mainly through. bilateral debt rescheduling 
agreed with the Paris Club (the equivalent of  some US$ 3.6 billion). Negotiations with the 
London Club of commercial bank creditors were also started but have not come to a final 
conclusion yet.  Commercial debt service reduction contributed some US$  0.8 billion to 
balance of  payments financing in 1994.  / 
Exceptional financing has permitted the Bank of  Algeria to clear some US$ 0.5 billion of 
arrears and  strengthen its international reserve  position,  which reached  nearly  US$  2.2 
billion (2.4 months of  imports) at end 1994, up from US$ 1.4 billion early 1994. 
3.  Structural reforms 
Stringent  administrative  import  controls  and  foreign  currency  allocations  have  been 
abolished in  April  1994  and  replaced by  a more liberal  regime  comprising a system of 
professional criteria for importers and  a limited list of prohibited imports.  The latter list 
has been gradually reduced and was abolished end  1994, except for goods prohibited for 
religious  and  security  reasons  .. The list  of goods  subject to professional criteria is  also 
being reduced and is expected to be abolished towards the end of 1995. State monopolies 
on  certain  imports  have  also  been  eliminated.  Access  to  foreign  currency  has  been 
completely liberalised  for  all visible  current account  transactions  by  private  and  public 
enterprises. Only imports financed through foreign credits are still subject to authorisation. 
The  five  state-owned  banks  have  been  audited  regularly  since  1992  and  institutional 
development plans  have  been put in place.  The Bank  of Algeria  has  strengthened  its 
supervisory capacity and  established  more effective prudential regulations and  controls. 
Although banks are· free to set their own creditor and debtor iuterest rates, a ceiling of 5 
percentage points has been imposed on the spread between average creditor. and ·debtor 
rates for each bank.  In  1995, management contracts are expected to be signed  between 
the Ministry of  Finance and bank managers. Banks will receive a banking license provided 
that prudential ratios, set by the Bank of  Algeria, are respected. ..  .  .  .  30 
The legal environment for private enterprises improved considerably. A commercial code 
. was promulgated in 1993, putting private and public enterprises on an equal legal footing. 
The investment code authorizes foreign investments in all  sectors of the  economy and 
. provides for the full  repatriation of profits.  A competition law was  adopted in January 
1995  which  liberalises  the  price  regime  and  puts  stringent  .limits  on  cartels  and 
monopolies. 
Nearly  400.  public  enterprises  were  ·given · autonomous  status  ·in  ·1992  and · their.'·  · 
management was transferred to several Participation Funds. Restructuring plans have-beeu 
prepared  for  the  remaining  23  non-autonomous  public  enterprises.  and,  foUowing  the 
signature of management contracts and a one-off injection of rehabilitation funds  by the:· 
Treasury, their are scheduled to become autonomous by the end of 1995. 
The possibility to privatize public enterprises was first introduced in the 1994 Budget Law 
that authorized the sale of public assets.  A pilot privatization programme comprising  5 
hotels  has  been  launched  in  November  1994.  A  privatization  law  and  a  more 
comprehensive privatization programme are currently in preparation. The present political 
and  security  situation is,  of course,  riot  conducive  to private  sector investments,  both 
domestic and foreign, in Algeria. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following the  agreement in  principle  between the Algerian  authorities  and  the  IMF  in 
April  1994  and  a  request  for  further  macro-finan~ assistance  from  the  Algerian 
authorities,  the  Council  endorsed  the  Commission's  intention  to  release  the  remaining 
second  tranche  of the  1991  programme  and  agreed  in  principle  on additional  macro-
fipancial assistance for an amount ofECU 200 million. 
The  second  tranche of ECU  1  SO  million  was  effectively  disbursed  in August  and  the 
Commission proposal for an additional ECU 200 million macro-financial assistance, to be 
disbursed  in  two  tranches,- was  adopted  by  the  Council  on  22  December  199411•  A 
Memorandum of Understanding specifying the conditions related to the disbursement of 
the first tranche of  ECU 100 million has been agreed with the Algerian authorities in early 
1995.  The structural reform conditions relate to further liberalisation of the imports and 
exchange rate regimes, reforms in the financial sector and progress towards restructuring 
and  privatization  of public  enterprises.  Furthermore,  the  Memorandum  emphasizes 
Community concerns in the social sector and synergy between macro-financial assistance 
:.-. · '•  and  other  Community  aid  instruments,  which  could  facilitate  the  implementation  of 
economic reforms in Algeria. Disbursement of  this fkst tranche will take place as soon as 
the economic reforms agreed upon in the Memorandum have been implemented, normally 
by mid-1995, and provided that the IMF programme remains on track. 
The conditions related to the release of the second tranche will be negotiated at a later 
stage, after the disbursement of  the first tranche and the approval by the IMF Board of a 
new programme with Algeria. 
• 
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IV •.  BALTIC COUN'I'RIES 
1.  llltrodacdon 
The three Babic  state~, who reco...-l their  sovenipty in Aupst 1991, bad  llready 
initiated mcxma qader the put regime after the adop&ion by the Supreme Soviet of  the 
bill  OD their economic iDdepeDdmce in November  1989. In 1992, u  they w.-Ueady . 
actively  enppd on  the  way of reforms  to  a market· ecoaomy,  ICODOIIIie  JX'Oipectl 
worseaecl.  1'be cljmntptlina  of trade  relitioDs  11110111  former  Soviet  republica  IDd  tbe 
iacreue of  pneea of  e811JY importa &Om llullia to world le\W rllultecl iD a  trlde abock  _ 
·and an apected deficit of  their atema1 accounta which -Mn upected to be tmtu•i-IM 
without  intematioaal  support.  The  three  countries  defiMcl  ltiDiiiation  aad  reform 
programmei  coverma  the  period  mid-1992  to  mid-1993  ud  canduded ~ 
· arraapmllltl with .die IMF.  CJ-.24 donors were called to contribute to fill the fWD.Iining 
apected balmce ofpaymeat~  gap for the proaramme period, wth•ted at:a·level ofUSS 
lOS million for &toail, US$ 210 million for LaMa IDd US$.215  miDioll in the cue of 
Lithumia. On  the bail  offavourable prospects ofmpport witbiathe 0.:.24, the IMP board 
approved the stand-by mangemeats in September ~  October 1992. 
In  November 1992 the EC Counal approved macro-financUIIIIillaMe of  up to BCU 220 
milliont, for the three countries (ECU 40- million for Bstcmia, ECU 80 miBion for Latvia 
and ECU 100 million for Lithuania) in support of  the countriel')fOil'a1DIDel. Tbe bulk of 
the .  remaining  bilaterll  support  within  the  G-24  group  ~:  from  Japan ·ad BFI'  A 
countriel. Loan agreements and Memoranda of U~  beta- the CommuDity 
and  each  beneficiary were  signed  in ·early  1993.  The Commiainn  disburied  the  first 
traaches (500.4 of  the loaniiDOUiltl) in March.1993  for Estoaia and Latvia, and in July 
1993  for I.ithnania.  The  release  of the  lletODd  trlllthea '\¥Ia. lUIIe subject  to politive 
evaluation of petformanc:e  criteria,  regarding both macroec:oDomic  stabiliaatioa  aspects 
and progresi of  structural reforms, as set in the Memor&nda of  UndentaDdiag. 
2.  Receat economic developments 
E.sk»>ia 
Estonia started to implement liberalisation measures,· mainly: on prices,  alreldy under the 
previous  Soviet rqime in  1990  and  1991.  The Bank of Estenia was re-eaabliahed  in 
1990. Ill March 1992 most import duties were abolished, except for a few goods like can, 
tobacco and alcohol. Prices liberalilation had been almolt completed by mid-1992. In June 
1992 the EJtonian kroon was introduced and pegpd to the DM at a r&te.of eight· kroons 
to one DM ~a  currency board arrqement. ·The new  restrictive monetary  policy, 
which under the cuJTeDCy board is constrained by the level of  foreign exchange reserves 
held in the central bank, proved successful in st:abiliaina the ecoaomy and bringing back 
inflation down to two digit levels in 1993. The kroon parity viH-viltbe DM has not been 
modified since 1992  .. 
Latest developments are favourable.  The economy emerged fiom recession by the end of 
1993 and GDP is estimated to have grown by 6% in 1994, despite a severe drought wbich 
hampered agricultural production.  Monetary growth under the currency board discipline 
12  Decdion 921s4VEBC, OJ of  the EC, N° LJSl/29, 2.12.1995. 32 
remained moderate and fell -to a level of  300/0. The gelieral government budget was overall 
in  balance,  reflecting  improvements  of revenue  perfoi'IIUUlCe.  The  inflation  remained 
however high with the consumer price index (Dec. on Dec.) increasing by 47%. After the 
establishment of the Estonian Privatiaation Office ia  1993  to better co-ordinate policies 
towards the enterprise sector, privatization accelerated iii  ·earty 1994. While the process of 
small scale privatization is almost complete with 1  SOO  small enterprises sold,  258 large 
scale enterprises had also been  sol~ by the end of  the year.  · 
The shift of  the country's trade to the west was sharp:  in  1994 EU and EFTA countries 
accounted for 6S% of  exports and over 70% of  imports. The recovery of  growth and of 
investment related imports lead to substantial imports. Despite a sharp growth of  exports, 
the trade balance  last year was  negative for  the first  time  since  19,91  and  the current 
account deficit reached 6.S% of GDP.  However,  owing to substantial inflows of  private 
for~  direct  investments,  the  capital  account  recorded  a  substantial  surplus,  which  · 
allowed foreiln exchange reserves to continue increasing.  On  1 January  1995  the Free · 
Trade Agreement ~th  the Europeill Union entered into force. A Europe agreement wai 
signed in June 1995. Estonia becomes an associated country to the European Union. 
The  programme under the IMP  stand-by  arrangement for  the  period  October  1993  to 
March 1995  remained  on-track and  in March  1995  the Fund  approved a new  stand-by 
arrangement.of an amount of SDR 14 million (about US$  21  million) for a new fifteen 
month period. Howeveri it is expected that the Estonian authorities will not draw on this 
facility unless needed.' · 
Latvia 
Reforms in Latvia already started under the previous Soviet regime, as in the other Baltic 
states.  Prices  and the external -trade liberalisation were fully· completed by mid  1992.  A  · 
two tier banking system \vas established in· 199~. In niid-1992 the country left the rouble 
zone,  introduCed  &  t~poivy currency  (the  Latvian  rouble)  and  initiated  stabilisation 
measures,  in particular a Strict  monetary  policy,  and  further  structural  reforms.- Latvia 
pursued a strict budgetary discipline, which lead to a surplus of the general government 
budget in 1993  (0.6% of GDP)  ~era  low deficit in 1992 (0.8%).  The privatization of 
small  firms  was  initiated  in  l992.  A national  currency,  the  Lats,  was  introduced  in 
Summer 1993. The tight stabilisation measures produced significant results. By the end of 
1993 inflation had been brought down to ~  S% (Dec. to Dec.). 
Developments in  1994 were broadly positive.  After a sharp contraction of  output during 
the  previous  years  (GDP  felll>y  35%  in  1992  and  IS%  in  1993),  GDP  stabilised  and 
started to grow again, by 2%. Inflation continued to decline down to a 26% level (Dec. to 
Dec.). The financial deficit of  the budget was kept within the 2% target,· despite significant 
wages and pension increases.  However, owing to the authorities' decision to lend to the 
Latvian electricity utility to clear external  gas  arrears vis-a-vis  Russia,  the fiscal  deficit 
which stood at 4% of  GDP was higher than anticipated. 
While  exports  remained  stable  relatively  to  1993,  imports  grew  significantly  in  1994, 
which lead to a significant current account deficit of  about 3. 4% of  GDP, against a surplus 
in  1993. However, as in  1993, the capital account was in surplus mainly owing to large 
private capital inflows, which allowed for a further consolidation of  the country's level of 33 
fofeiP. exchange reseNeS, worth S months of imports. On 1 January 199S ~  ~ree Tradt; 
Agreement with the European Union entered into force. A Ew"ope agreement was signed 
in June 1995.  · 
The authorities maintained the momentum of structural reforms.  In order tG  consolidate 
the financial  sector, the  balance  sheets of the  two major banks,  the .  Universil Bank. of 
Latvia  and  the  Latvian  Savings  Bank,  were  streagthened.  In the  Context  of a tighter 
banking· supervision nilie baDka had their licences withdrawn in  1994.  In November the 
authorities launched auctions for the privatization of  68 large enterprises, :which ~  been 
delayed pending the settlement of  property rights issues.  · 
The !ME stand-by programme for the period December  1993  to· March  1995  remained 
on-track.  The Latvian authorities and the IMF reached an agreement on a new stand-by 
arrangement for a thirteen month period which the IMP board approved in April 1995, for 
an  amount  of SDR 27.45  million  (about  US$  41  million).  As  in the  case  of Estonia 
however, it is not expected that the authorities will ~e  use of  this-facility,  unless their 
level of  reserves becomes tighter.  · 
Lithuania 
Structural reforms in Lithuania already started in February 1991, when firma were allowed 
to  raise  their  prices  within  certain limits.  By  early  1992  most  prices  had  been  fr~. 
Privatisation also was also initiated in 1991. Vouchers were distributed in April, and small 
firms auctions started in September of  this year. In Spring 1992 Lithuania left the rouble 
zone and issued an temporary currency, the talonas. ln)uly 1993 a new currency, the litu, 
was  introduced.  However  reforms  were  slower  in  other  areas,  in  particular 
macroeconomic  stabilisation,  ·external  trade  liberalisation  and  the  financial  sector. 
Deregulation and the shift within the price structure lead to a high inflation peaking in 
1992  at a 720C'A  (average) level.  Monetary  policies  however were  tightened  in  Spring 
1993  and a sound management of the state budget,  which was kept in surplus,  allowed 
inflation to decrease in 1993 (19()0/o, year average). 
After several.years of  recession GDP stabilised and rose slightly in  1994 (  +2% estimate). 
In April  1994 the government introduced  a currency board  arrangement,  according  to 
which the money in circulation in constrained by the amount of  hard currencies held in the 
Bank of  Lithuania.  The litas is pegged at a fixed rate of  four Htas to one US dollar.  This 
was  a major step in the stabilisation of the  economy,  Mcmetary growth under the new 
arrangement was kept moderate and inflation further decreased down to 45%. The 1994 
state  budget  was  in  deficit  of about  3%  of GDP  owing  to  lower. than  expected 
government revenues, particularly over the first semester. The slow registration of newly 
established  private sector firms,  as well as  delays  encountered in the  transition  from ·a 
general  excise  tax to a  value  added  tax explain  this  poor  revenue  performance.  The 
extemal trade was further  liberalised  in  May,  when  the  authorities  suppressed  import 
tariffs on several goods: by that time, two thirds of  imports were zero rated, while most of 
the other imports carried a I  0%  rate.  In July  however import tariffs  on a broad  list of 
agricultural goods were raised  to  an  average  40%  level.  Th~ share  of the west  in  the 
counuys external trade is continuing to increase.  About  SO%  of Lithuania's exports are 
now  directed  to western markets.  Lithuania's  trade  and  current  account  have  been  in 
deficit since 1993.  In 1994 the current account recorded a US dollar 375  million deficit 
(i.e. 0.4% ofGDP). Owing to substantial public and private capital inflows this deficit was 
largely covered by the capital account's surplus. Foreign exchange reserves which are all 34 
the more crucial under the currency board arrangement continued to increase and covered  _ 
by the end of  the year about three months of  imports. On 1 Jamwy 1995 the Free Trade 
.AsfeemeDt with the European Union entered into force. A Europe Agreement was siped 
in June 1995. Lithuania becomes an uaociated country to the European Union. 
1994  wu also. a  year  of change  in  core  structural  areas.  Privatisation  continued  to 
progress; by September 76% of  all eligible companies, representing 3~/o of  the initial state 
uaets, had  been. privatized.  In December the Central Bank law wu enacted,. and  was 
followed  by  the  adoption of the. Commercial Banlring law in early  1995.  Performance 
under the stand-by IITanpment agreed  with the IMP for  the period  October 1993  to 
Much 1995  was  satisfactory.  Following  the  approval  of the  government  three-year 
programme last Autumn, aiming at a mstained 5% growth of  GDP, the. IMF approved on 
October 24 an SDR 134.55 million (about US$ 202 million) extended facility replacing 
the Current stand-by programme.  This ahould allow Lithuania to build up the necessary . 
reserves and to' finance key eaergy and investment related imports. 
3.  Implementation of  macro-fiDUcial usistance 
In view of  the above; the Commission considers that performance criteria attached to the 
Community loan facilities have &een broadly met by all three countries.  The Baltic states 
have successf\dly implelnented stabilisation policies agreed with the IMF, which renewed 
its support by the means  ~fa  three-year Extended Facility (EFF) for Lithuania in October 
1994, and new stand-by· arrangerilents with Estonia and Latvia respectively in March and 
April1995.  . 
As  signs  of an  ~nomic recovery  in  the  three  Baltic  states ·are  accumulating,  it  is 
expected that ~  current account positions will deteriorate in  1995-1996, driven by a 
high ~  of investment  related  imports.  These  countries  may  therefore  experience 
substantial current account deficits over the next Few years and would have to rely heavily 
on capital inflows.  Qwin8 to' the expected iilcreasing demand for investment related hard 
currency  finance  in· these :~tries, the  Commiasion  after  consulting  the  Monetary 
Committee exceptionally agreed in supplemental Memoranda of  Understanding negotiated 
with the authorities to channel·the bulk of the second tranches of the loans, through the 
domestic banking sectors, to ~·sound  projects. 
The disbursement of the second tranche of the loans has however been delayed.  In the 
case of Latvia and Lithuania, this was due 'to the Commission's request in early 1994 of 
further  evidence  of progress ' on  structural  reforms,  in  particular  in  the  areas  of 
privatization and financial sector. reform. In the case of  Estonia, which has advanced more 
quickly on both stabilisation and stnictuial reforms, the release of  the second tranche was 
delayed pending clarification from the authorities on their readiness to channel the bulk of 
the proceeds of  the loans through the banking sector. ..  . 
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R.-1 GDP lll'tber deciUwd, the budaet·defidt deteriorated, domecic blllk radit  apancled ... ,·· 
fait,  fin...;.t  ·:dieciptine  ... of state:  llltei'Jid-~whr;r'  ·~Ud•tbe  .  .,...-:of tlie ·  •..Ntitout  ·-;.,-;~. 
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Ceatral Bat,(BNB) ..,.•pd·tbe  .....,....l'lte1brouaJa·lizeRh .__.._  ili'Gidet to"·.~~. 
cant8in die lev clepreclation, bpt price and trade Jhnlinaoa llld _.  proar.a in the'.·· 
field. of fiacal reform.  J..  a remit· of·  aerious  policy  lllipplael,.· ·WIIk maci-oecoaomic 
""""pment aad a arowiD8 uacertainty ·on the reform pace,  in 1993  the couatry wu · 
virtually cut  off~  the.intemational financial  Support,  IDd wu 1mtble  to ·reac&  an 
· ·-agreement with the IMP on a new ltand-by maagemfllt. 
Duriag the last quarter of  1993 the overall economic. climate improved .pificandy owq 
to two major events: 
- a  prelim;nary  agreement .  was  reached  with  Buisana's  COIDIDercial  creditors  for  a 
comprebeaaive debt aacl debt service reduction programme(DDSR); 
· - a new, creclibl•policy pro~  for-1994 was formulated;  · ·:. . 
In April 1994 the IMF approved a global assistance package o(USS 421 million (of  which 
US$  97  million  as  a  twelvHDODth  ·Stand-· by  and  US$  324  million  u  Systemic 
TraDBfonDition  Facility).  In  July  Bulgarian  authorities  fiyljact  the  debt  reduction 
arrangement with their commercial baDk creditors.  In order to eaable Bulpria to meet 
debt reduction-related up-front disbunements, the Fuud and the World Bank decided in 
September to augment their financial contribution by US$ 22.S miDion. 
In the framework of  the G-24 co-ordination process, the COIDimlllity decided in April to 
recoafirm ita commitmellt of a loin of  ECU 110 million which, if  appropriate, could be 
increased to ISO mi1Jionl3. The rest ofG-24 financial commitmems in favour of  Bulgaria 
amounted to US$ 93.7 million. 
1.  Macroec:oaomic performance 
The policy programme for  1994 focused  on the urgent need to implement a tight fiscal 
and  monetary  policy  aimed  at restoring  the domestic  and  external  equilibrium.  These 
policies rather than interventions by the Central Bank should lead to the stabilization of 
· exchange rate. The stabilization policy was associated with an •mbirious structural reform 
programme  bued  upon ·  ibrther  rationalization  and  privatization  of state  assets,  a 
·-strengthening  of fiDanc:ial  monitoring  of loss-making  eDterpriles,  ·completion  of the  · · 
restitution programme and a more striDgent control on access to credit. 
Achievements have been mixed.  In 1994 the Bulgarian economy stopped shrinking. Real 
GDP increased by  1.4%,(-2.4% in 1993).  Industrial procblction grew by 4%  (-8.S% in 
1993), reflecting a more favourable business climate, the expansion of  the private sector 
and new export oppoitunities. Agriculture grew by 11% in 1994; in services there was an 
.  ' 
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overall  decline;  Unemployment  declined  from  16%  in·l993  to  around  13%  in  1994, 
reflecting partly the economic turnaround and the deletion from labour office registration 
lists of  a significant number of  unemployed who beCame ineligible for social benefits. 
_.,. · ·  ·  ·•.:  ~·:Despite a tight monetary. and credit policy,  ~significant price.fluctuations -occurred-in -1.994i! .  .: · 
· as a result of  price libemlization and  setbaCks to economic policy,· particularly exc1wJse ·"'· 
rate turbulences ..  The ~-on-yearCPI  inflation reached -12L9'A (63:8%in 1993):·  ..  :··.'-'•  ._.:;.~~~ft.· 
·;·;· 
In 1994 the govemment.implemented a restrictive fiscal policy,  aimed.-at.reining-in:~·  ··~ .•. 
·deficit and hardemng the budgetary constraint facing  state- owned enterprises.  Nominal  . 
non-interest expenditure rose less than inflation, subsidies have been cut to around 2-3% 
ofGDP and the budget deficit/GOP ratio contracted to 6.7% (15.7% in 1993):  ..... ···--· ..... . 
The  government's  planned  incomes  policy  in  1994  was  moderately  restrictive,  with 
nominal wage upper ceilings consistent with projected inflation targets.  Due to higher-
than-expected inflationary pressures,  incomes,  (in  particular those in the public  sector) 
declined sharply in real terms. 
·As.regards.Bulgaria's external developments, the structural shift in foreign trade towards 
OECD was further consolidated,  reflecting the  positive impact of association and trade 
agreements with EU and EFT  A, the lev devaluation, and low labour costs. In 1994, trade 
balance showed a Surplus of  US$ 200.million (against a deficit of900 million in 1993).and.,.,.;.,.:.' 
the current account was balanced (against a deficit of  US$ 1.4 bn in 1993). 
Foreign Direct  Investment  remained  extremely  low  (US$  105  million),  despite  liberal 
legislation  passed  in  January  1992.  However,  external  official  financing  greatly 
contributed to the replenishment, by year end, of Bulgaria' foreign exchange reserves to 
around US$ 1 bn, equivalent to three months of  imports. 
As regards foreign debt management, the DDSR agreement  with the London Club was 
brought to closure on July 28,  1994.  Overall, it is estimated that the agreement reduced 
Bulgaria's 8.2 bn US$ debt to western commercial banks by 46-48%. The up-front costs 
of the  operation  (US$  715  million)  were  partly  covered  by  Bulgaria's  hard  currency 
international  reserves  (US$  474  million)  and  partly  by  exceptional  official  external 
financing  (US$  241  million).  Furthermore,  in  April  1994  a  third  Paris  Club  debt 
rescheduling  arrangement  was  reached  between  Bulgaria  and  its  official  creditors, 
covering all  obligations falling  due from the previous rescheduling until April 30,  1995. 
Following  these  arrangements,  Bulgaria's  relations  with  the  international  financial 
::  ·  ·-.  community were restored. 
3.  Structural reforms 
Despite  a  number  of constraints,  policy  slippages,  political  uncertainty  and  weak 
management,  Bulgaria  was  successful  in  maintaining  during  1994  previous  policy 
achievements such as price and  trade liberalization,  current account convertibility and  a 
liberalized exchange rate regime. 
A number  of unresolved  problems  remain  however• as  regards  enterprise  restructuring, 
privatization and the reform of  the financial system. 
With respect to price liberalization it is estiQiated that at present around 90% of.all retail  .. 
turnover  takes  place  under  a  free  price  regime.  However,  price  controls  are  still .  ' 
' 
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maintained on several products and services including energy, telecemmunications, water 
supply and traDiports. Despite several upward adjustments, these administered prices in 
.  1994 have not kept pace with inflation.· The government is committed  to· proJrellively  ,  . 
.  _,:_...  . .  :-..r=--·  .  1- ·...;..w...-1  ~--- "  •  .  ~- .,  .. .,wwu ·up·· exiltia&···WUII~~:pnce  •contro  ... ~onragn""'"""•·  ·p&\JUIAM .. ,JNDI"'I!D~:.tB-~ 
prices, minii!IUID import prices, maximum margins etc.).  ·  · ·.  ·  , ·  .. 
.  . 
: :'·•. The progreaa:m trtlds:libmllization aince.·l992 hu·been·~wt·UilfiYeD.:•Bxport:~• 
.,  :.. '··: ·  ..... ;; :  ..  probibitiODS:~.ha\l&!.bem;zemoved~anc:hexport  :;quotu.;·on. some.  ..  ·lO.t:producti~ve.~•:- ·. 
replaced with aport  taxes. The 3% import surcharge wu lowered to 2% in Jamwy 1994, ~  i. .. 
but by mid  1994  the· government·. still kept some  .  temporary trade burien to protect ·  ~ ..  · 
domestic inc:luatly and agriculture, in the form of minimum import prices, import·liceaces .... ·~. 
etc. Bulgaria' Interim Aaociation Agreement with the EU entered into -force  o~  Jamwy;.f  · 
':•  ·'  •. '.t 
1,1994.  ' 
.. 
Bulgaria's foreign exchange rate regime has been liberalized, effective on February 1994. 
Foreign exchange ceilings for current personal payments (tourism, etc.) -by reaidents have 
been raised  significantly and  current account convertibility ia. easurec:l  for trade- telated 
payments. Some restrictions on current payments and tnnsfera are however still in force. 
Significant  progress  bas  been  accomplished  in  the  field  of property  restitution  which 
triggered a fast development of  a dynamic, private retail and trado. sector(it nov.: accounts 
for over 500/o of  all retail and wholesale trade in the counuy).  · 
The state enterprise sector is weak and debt- ridden  .. Budget constraints on en~  are 
too soft and aedit ceilings by the banking System aie circumvented via the accumulation 
of  inter-enterprise arrears (at present they may account for about one quarter of  the value 
of industrial  production).  In order to tackle  these  problems  the .  government's  strategy 
focuses on implementing financial rescue plans, entesp~  restrocturing ~  privatization. 
; 
A Law passed in December 1993 authorized the goveniment to issue long~ te~  bonds in 
both  domestic  and  foreign  currency  aimed  at  replaCing  uncollectable,  lev  and  dollar-
denominated loans and interest arrears accumulated in banks' portfolios by end of 1991. 
Loans  to  state enterprises will therefore be borne  by the  govemnient which eventually 
might convert them into equity ·or decide for their wriic-off or rescheduling as  soon as 
companies are restructured _or privatized.  : 
In the field of  restructuring, major steps undertaken during 1994 include the formulation 
by  main  loss-making  enterprises  of comprehensive  losS-reduction  and  rationalization 
plans,  and the development of a mechanism to monitor bank credit to these enterprises, 
with a view to strengthening their financial discipline. 
As regards privatization,  in  1994  the  government  was  determined  to  accelerate  the 
programme implementation by amending the  Privatisation Law with the aim to facilit~e a 
standard,  market-based  privatization  via  the  Privatisation  Agency,  complete  the  small 
scale privatization and carry out, in parallel,  a mass  privatization scheme involving  500 
medium  and  large  scale  enterprises.  However,  owing  to  the  absence  of the  required 
political  determination  by  the  interim  government  to  carry  out  the  programme,  the 
implementation of mass privatization has been delayed and privatization through standard 
methods proceeded only slowly . 
..  , .At  present.· the  Bulgarian -banking  system  is· stilL affected  by .. a~~um~er of constraints, 
including  undercapitalization,  inadequate  management,  insufficient  supervision  by  the 
. '  . 
.. 
.  "-·.,  . .. .  . 
I  o  . 
.  ·~ .  .  •'  . 
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Central Bank on capital adequacy and prudential regulations, a slow p~on.proceu, 
lack of  fiNDCial.  discipline (•easy credit•),  fta~tation  and a growing number of non- . 
performiDs loana to enterprises.  In order to .  cope ·'With this  highly  disturbing situation, -·, 
.•..  ,~·.t ·  ~·  ! • .:several actions have beeD.undertakeo.in.J994-'lllbe.-capability.of.the;.BanJring.SupepUi.on·-.  .. , 
· Department at' the BulpriaD National Buk hu:been atreDgthened .. Two regular tbll·on- .~·;~:·  .  .  . 
site inapections to problematic binb were carried out by mid  1994 and two more were  -~  .· 
·  ·"  :· .... , "prosrammed  by 'yeat.' eacf:'t'A ·~-~D.'~programme  ·WU"CC!Dpletedtbaderthe···  . 
·-!':>i~..l·  ·,.; • :"tegi.aiof:the:'Biu-.Couolidation:"Gompany.~(BCC)·;so•tbat~-66-..publiG.·sector.~·banks'bava·· · ·i 
been  merged  into  11  major  baub. ·Bad ··loans  dean-out  proceeded  but the  gradual  ·.::·, 
recapitalization of  the banks progressed only slowly owing to its budgetary costs. In 1994  . 
a timetable for a: gradual-privatization ~fsome  banks Was prepared and is expected-to be·':'.  •' 
, .. , 
·~.  .. 
carried out by the end of  1995.  . . ,  , 
4.  Imp~ementation  of  macro-fmancial assistance 
The disbursement of the ECU 110 million Community loan decided in October 1992 in 
the framework of  G-24, as a complement to the IMF assistance to Bulgaria, was delayed 
as the 1992 stand-by IJTIIIgement with the Fund went off track. For the same rea&On no 
· other~ G-24  .. assistance  was  released  under  this  initial  package.  At the  end  of 1993 
conditions were reStored for the resumption ofEU/G-24 assistance to Bulgaria. Following 
the adoption of a new IMF stand-by arrangement, on May  16,  1994, the: Council of the . 
EU agreed with the Commission that the 1992 decision on Community maao-financial . 
assistance to Bulgaria could be re-activated. in the context of the new programme.  The 
release of  a first tranche (ECU 70 million) took place in December 1994 on the basis of 
the approval of the new IMF  stand-by and the  debt relief arrangement agreed between 
creditors. The release of  the .second tranche is conditional upon observlnce by Bulgaria of 
standard macro-economic performance criteria including a satisfactory track record of  the 
. IMF stand -by, a proper implementation of  DDSR operation and progress with structural  · 
reform.  ' 
/ 
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VI.  MOLDOVA 
1.  Introduction 
· · ·  . · ·  ..  On  13  June 1994 the .Council of  the.European·Union'decided·~  'grant the·llepublic of·t;.} 
Moldova a loan of  BCU 4S million with a maximum duration of  ten years•• to iuist the .. · 
· ,  country in its efforts.  to.transformcits.-economy~tQ.a:-·market-.econo~to·~~  ... ·  .-..  ··· 
. ·reserve position of  the central bank. -The. Co.,nnity  loan.wu p~  of  _.an .overall ~w*'~  ... · 
mobilised by the international donor comiDJmity in favour of  MoldPva to CQmpl~  the :>~ 
resourcei provided by the IMF and the World Bank.  · 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
I 
. Following the introduction, in November  1993, of its national currency- the Moldovan  ~- ~ 
leu-, Moldova has made a decisive tun1 towards financial stabiliaation in the cOntext of  the 
economic programme supported by an IMF stand-by arrangement (approved in December 
1993)  and  complementary  assistance  from  the  interilational  community,  including  the 
ECU 4S million Community loan. 
.The programme was implemented in a very difficult environment. Real GOP is estimated 
to have fallen by about 22% in 1994, compared with an anticipated decline of3%. This is 
in part attributable to the continuing disruptions to output and trade associated with t4e 
collapse of central planning. Industrial production fell by about 300/o in the first semester 
of 1994, before stabilising in the second half of  the year. Furthermore, a severe drought, 
followed  by  flooding  and  hail  storms,  devastated  key _crops  in  this  mostly  agricultural 
country in the third quarter of 1994. 
Despite this unfavourable ecOnomic environment, the Moldovan authorities demonstrated 
considerable  resolve  and  consistency  in  the  pursuit  of financial  stabilisation.  Reviews 
under the IMF stand-by arrangement were successfully completed in June and December 
1994, and all performance criteria ·for end-December 1994 were met. The key objective of 
the progfamme was a rapid and sustained reduction in the rate of  inflation based on the 
introduction of the leu,  and a stabilisation of the exchange rate.  As a result of the firm 
implementation of  the programme, inflation decelerated sharply in 1994. The monthly rate 
of inflation fell from an average rate of about 200.4  in the fourth quarter of 1993  to an 
average  rate  of about  3%  in  the  fourth  quarter  of 1994.  As  inflation  subsided,  the 
exchange rate stabilised and  the credibility of the leu was enhanced (as reflected  by the 
reversal of  currency substitution), allowing a decline in nominal and real interest rate8. 
Fiscal deficit for  1994 was contained to 8% of GOP,  despite the greater-than-envisaged 
decline in real output and inflation.  However, liquidity problems in the enterprise sector' 
impeded tax collection and resulted in the assumption by the government of guaranteed 
loans  to  enterprises  in  default.  Furthermore,  expenditure  arrears  rose  by  some  .1  1/2 
percent of  GOP, including arrears on wages, as a result of  the application of  a strict cash 
· management system. 
The balance of payments remained under,severe pressure throuihout·.l994·,primarily as a 
result of higher prices for imported energy and the effects of natural disasters. Based on 
14  ·(Council Decision 941346/EC) ••  .  40 
prelirniauy data, the current account deficit wu equiva1eat to 9% of  GDP. Moldova wu.. 
biply. depDdeat on  foreign  uailtaace,  the ·  disburlemalt .  of which  covered  JOJDe  SO 
perceat of  total importl. The IMP. aDd the World Blllk contributed some 56 peReDt of 
. ·" .·  .,  ~~-totalforeip alli.stence, and  ot~~er~bilatenll  .  .some:44•.perceat,.inJdiaa~tbe-BU.  (BCU:2S.~.-N 
•.• wmillion cori'elpoDdiDa to the fitlt traDdae·of tbe·macm-fiDaDcial·uMallce); Japan (US$ ,,~-=.-_ 
30 mjllion), the US (USS 20 miiJioD)·md Rnmuia (USS 10 million). Purthermore,:irrem  -,~ · 
··"':  · · ~-~ ·  to-Ruaia mostly by MoJdovm-;~U.-'torwsr~naclled--tbe'-equivallat~·-. 
,  -.~.-,., J!.  -'l·'~ USS,t20·millimuWith-dle·pace of,~&.foreip4ailtace-iDcr=......,lut..,.._· 
year, ·groa raerves of  the celltlal baDk i'eadled the equivlleat of3 lllOilthl ofimportl·at · 
eDd-1~.  . 
_At  this  aitica1  juncture  of the  stabiliaation  proceas, ~-the""~ovan  .autborities.--:have.,  ... 
fonm.,.eted an ambitious strategy for -1995 with the objective of  consolidating the progress 
in stabilisation and intemifying structural reforms. The programme tbat.is supported-by a 
new IMP ltllld-by arraagement approved in March 1995 requires further complemlntary 
financlq hm  the in~onal  COIDII1UIIity.  · 
The programme ~  •  economic growth of 1.5%, led by a recovery in the lp'iculturaJ. 
sector. with. the .return- of normal weather conditions,  a reduction in the •nm•al rate of 
inflation to about  100.4  and the contaiiiiDI!Dt of  the deficit in the current account of·the 
balance of pa}meDtS.  To  these  ends,  fiacal  policy  is  centred  on  sharply  reducillg  the 
budgetary deficit to the ~valent  of3.S% and monetary policy is to remain tight. 
.  . 
In  the first  quart~ ·or 1995,· the  Moldovan  authorities  have  strictly  implemented  the 
financial  policies  contemplated  in  their  programme.  Baaed  on  prelimiDary  data,  all 
pafoi'IDIIlCe  criteria  for  end-March  have  been  met,  includins  a  better-thaD-spected 
foreign exchange position of  the central bank. This has resulte4 in a stable exchange rate 
and a containment of  inflationary pt:essuresu .. 
3.  s~  reforms  . 
The  pr~s  made in terms of structural reform in  1994 was  mixed.  State enterprises 
remairiecllarJely_ unresponsive to ~  forces (which resulted, inter alia,  ~  the increue 
in arrears to the budgCt and to external suppliers of  energy as indicated above), owing m 
part  to  ~  weakness  of the  bankruptcy  and  liquidation  process,  and  delays  in 
privatization. However, towards the eDd of  the year, there was a substantial acceleration 
of reform  efforts,  as  the  auth9.rities  recOgnised  that  further  delays  in  implementiDg 
structural reforms· threatened  to UDdermine  the stabilisation  gains.  A new  streamlined 
auction procedure  was introduced,  that facilitated  the implementation of an  ambitious · 
schedule for the auction of  state enterprises. The government also decided to identifY and 
initiate liquidation proceedings against seven of  the most problematic state entel'p!ises. 
The acceleration of structural reforms in late 1994 is to-be sustained -in  1995 through an·:---· 
accelerated privatization programme. the establishment of the legal basis for biDkruptcy 
proceedings,  the  strengthening  of the  capital  base  of the  banking  system  and  the 
develop~ent ofindirect, market-based monetary controls. 
ts  Monthly inflation rate average 2.S% in January-February, slightly exceeding the tar&d rate owing to 
the tempomy growth of reserve money at end 199.4 (raulting from the bunc~g  of disburaement of 
·· •--~· .~.,·  n  ·'  ~ '· •:extemaJ. usiltaN:e) and the effect oftheliberalization·ofpricea·in·neiJbbouring Ukraine. .  .. 
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4.  lmpltateatatiea of  macro- rmandal aailtaace 
The Community loan of  BCU 45 million decicled .on 13 JUDe 1994 wu to be dilbuned in 
two tna£hea, upon jblfilment of  the. maczo..economic CODditimll attacbed to it. The first 
· trandle,  of ECU  2S~.million, wu disbursed  in December  "1994,  on  the- bliP  of the 
succeuful  completion  of  ~~ first  programme  review  under  the  IMP  stud-by 
arrangement. The disbursement of  the aecond tranche, ofECU 20 million, wa conddicmal 
upon a aJCCalibl track record of  the IMF stand-by arrugemeat ad  subject to a politive 
evaluation by the Commission of  performance criteria and of  progress made witll respect 
to  structural  reform  in the  areas  of price,  trade  and  foreign  exchange  hDeralisation, 
privatization, and financial dilcipline of  enterprises and finauci•lsector.  · 
Progress hu been indeed substantial in these di1feraJt areas. Prices of  goods and servites 
were  fully 1iberaJised  in the  course  of 1994,  with  the  exceptioDa  of eDeiJY  products, 
housing  rent,  telecommuDications,  publiO  transport,  comnw1nal  eervicea  aacl  the  State 
procurement price for grain.  Subsidies on agriculture products wee&-eliminated in May 
1994,  whereas  enecgy  subsidies  were removed  and replaced,  for  the molt vulnerable 
. .  · ,  .. · •groups of  the pppulation, by a cash compensation system.·  ~. 
Trade liberalilltion hu advaaced considerably: all exports quotas were removed with the 
eKCeption of grain  and  grain  products.  By end  1994,  Moldova lowered  ita  maximum 
import tariff to ·SO  Yo,  with the· exc:ePtion of a small number of luxury aoods, primarilr 
wine products and  CODIUD1el' electronics.  Import tarifti have been reduced to no more 
than 30 % on 1 April 1995 and a further reduction is expected by end-1995.  · 
In the area of  foreign exchange arrangements, authorisation wu aranted to non-residents 
in July 1994 to repatriate profits and the proceeds of  liquidation  of  their enterprises; also,· 
the  foreign  adl!nge surrender j requirement ··for ·export·· earaiap· by .. enterprises  was · 
· eljminated·in November 1994. Interbank foreign curreacy exchap bu  been eatablilhed,: 
where  reaideDta  caD. pun:hue  foreign  exdlange. for  IDOit  aureat payments and  non-. 
residents can purdwe foreign exchange to repatriate eamillp.  · 
•  In  -the· area· of privatization, the process was·· slower ·than· expected -but "has· accelerated 
during the last montbof  1994, so that, by end-December, 304 medium-and-large and_273 
small enterprises had been privatized, representing 2S % of  total state assets. The 1995-
1996 Privatisation,Programme has been approved by the Parliament on  lS March 1995, 
·,  .·  .·-'·:-whereby 2/3·ofaiate usets will be privatized.by end 1996.,.: .: ..  ,  ..  ·  ··-.:.h.-.·'  · I  I  42 
Regarding the reform of the bauking sector,  the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) is 
working on 'the new regulations that meet the standards set up by the Baale Committee. 
. The ne\v regulation-binding the coiDIIlfii'Cial banb to c1uaify their portfolio and establish · 
· ·  ·-~.  ·,  ":·. ·1·provisions:f'or·'.bad·~tow·hu ~·receatly~vecVA·new-draft.banlring  law,~  ..  _been"~ 
·  ··  prepared and .Ublmtted to the·Puliament  ... This law provides for. the independence of  the .  ,:.:, 
NBM in conducting the monetuy policy, as well as for the additional rights of  the NBM 
'.·'~-~<--.. ':'~dn.supervisingand<<:OntrolliDg-the·activities'of~mmercial-banks.-.!fhellew-41raft,banking~j~":·  .. 
.  .  ,_..  also  ... _.  ~ . ..:.-.~..:.  .  .  .  0  ..:1'!-L-.....:  d--.o.!-1  ·-,···=  0  .: •• 
.. ., 
' •  ·:·. ·.  ·~ JAW- pi'OVlue~~~ .10f .tJ'i'IIA&we&'m Clse•'O.l  ..  WIUM.;uODS'.to ·PnJ  a:lWil r..,&YAAWOnJ; '';;'  ~:.:~~":· :\" r:' !"!'":'-~~ · 
In view  of the  measures  taken  and  commitments  for  further  action  provided  by  the. 
Moldovan  authorities, thelconditioni attached to the disbursement of  the second tranche 
of  the Community loan are considered to be met.  ·  .....  H.  •  ...  :  0 , 
- ·  In order to ·ensure a sustainable· balance of payments  situation in  1995, further macro- .  · 
financial  assistailce in favour of Moldova to complement the resources provided by the 
IMP and the World Bank will be necessary,  as was recognised by the international donor 
commuDity in the fi'Unework of  the Consultative Group meeting organised by the World 
Bank in March 1995. JC'ollowing the disbursement of  the second tranche, the Commission 
··  r.·. 
0  intends· to present a·proposal.for. further macro-financial assistance to Moldova of  up to 
ECU l 5 million . 
• I  ·, 
• 
1.  IDtnductioa 
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VB. ROMANIA 
.  . 
•  ~; ,  ..  •,•·.,.Jn the ~·0~  1993~·inftetjorr,acnWAted,in··RO"'Mit.iD·tbe-wab·ofiUbltaatill.priee~ 
·JiberaliatioaL •  Loole- moae&uy policy ud  ·a lark of fintncial ...-in lt-.wwd  • . 
.  ·  ;  ..  eaterpriJel {SOBI)  tbrtblr~blled.  jnftetioJlJo.-aver-300%  .... 'llllenlt.l'ltll"were .ieeply~-· . 
.  _ .... ~  ..........  of•'-- ..  ~  ~  .  .... , ...  :··~nepave··  .... ·:m  .. a"......-·!Oat ..  :um'Leu·mto-.....  -....:oa~6icy~!~'~:··,..~--
. _  ... Natiooal ~-ofllQmuia  {NBll)'COtatitrwf .to tdnwi...._ die c4cW rate-.d;nwlhiple..""~· 
m:hmtge l'ltel ~  with the pp betMm the oflirial  IDd .die ·(priYate) _.....  · 
•  bureaux' a:cha,.. rate reaching more thaD  SO'At  by tbe ead of  tbe yell'.  Nill fonip.  . 
.  reserve~- lbrulk to leu  than uss so miltinn by eDd 1993, equivala to 3 days of·impor:ta,' ;.·. 
while  cornnwcial  blab held  IOIIle ··USS  1 billian  in fonip lllltl. VfltJ little wu 
· ·acbieved ·in the ·areas of  SOB restructuriag ·llld privatiDtion. D.,a  101De props in 
fiacal ref011111 and a reduction of  the fiiCII deficit to 2% of  GDP,  tile IMP :w.. DOt in a 
position to  condone its· financial  support for  ROJ!II,Jiia .  in 199l ud ~  c:omplem-taty 
BUJG..24 macro-fia111cill uliltace could be mobilised either  . 
. 
Only in December 1993 did the authorities reach an undentaDdills with tbe IMF on a new 
economic  prosnmme  for  1994-95.  In  May  1994,  the  IMP  Board  approved  tbiJ 
'p1"011'11D1De  and  the  accompanying  financing  facilities  ($taad-by  ud  Structural 
Tl'llllfolmation Facility) for 1D amount of  USS 700 million, folleWiaa BU/G-24 &DiftCiraa 
IISUI'IIlCel for the residual gap.  ·  · 
1.  Macroecoaomic developments 
The main objectives of  the 1994-95 programme are to reduce ID•..t inftatjon to U'OUIId 
70-75% by the end of 1994 and to significantly diminish the curreat accouat defidt  To 
achieve th ..  objectives, the authorities pledged to ~  interelt rates to positive levels 
in real term1; to liberalile the excbaDge rate regime, to limit tbe ftiCil deficit to 2.S% of 
GDP in 1994 and  to speed up privatization and  fiNDCial rutructuriaa of atat.ownec1 
enterprises. 
Monetary policy wu  tigbteaed towards the end of  1993. when dle NBR started to auction 
off part of  ita refiuncing credits i.t market-determined interest ratel.  This raulted in a 
general increase in interest rates throughout the banking system to politive levels in real 
terms.  The average cost of  NBR refinancing rose to more than 12% per month in early 
1994,  at the time when inflation rates fell  to S-8%  per month.  Nominal  iDtereat rates 
started to decline apin, although slowly, in the second and third quUt.n of  1994 , in line 
with iDflation.  The averap NBR. refinaaciag rate decreued to II'OUDd S% per month at 
the end of 1994, whea iDflation had slowed down to around 2% per mouth.  Intereat rates 
practised by coJDII1el'c.ial banks followed a similar pattern. 
The  increue in  interest rates  renewed  confidence  in the  Leu  and IW'I'owed  the  gap 
between the official excl:aange rate, fixed by the NBR, and the rate in the private exchange 
bureaux.  After a nominal depreciation of some  14% in February and March  1994,  the 
....  ·. NBR. ·-abandoned·•thet•administered  ... exchange·. rate  regime ·tand •I'Wi~  .. a· market-
determined  exchange rate in  early  April.  An  inter-bank foreign exchange market was 
established in August.  However, in the third  quart~ of 1994, a sipificant gap bcween 
official and private bureaux exchange rates re-occurred and persisted throughout tbe first 
.: . .. _.,·quarter  of·l99S;  .  .'although decreasing at. a  slow·p&eeJ:.3'bia·-indicated~-tbat the  foreign •.  .  .  .  • 
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exchaap market  wu· llOt fimctioDiDg  in a fully  trusparent way  and ·that .  the  official 
~rate  was not fully market-deariDg. 
··  .:. ......  •.\The COIIIOiidatecl fiscal deficit actually Jhowed·a'-small surplus for the first five months-of~ 
l
ftftA  But  .o.L.:- ..:..., .:-·  __.  _._:--LI  ~- ·.a..U:""-11.. L:.l~~-~  -··t•'·  .: .... ·•·  7r9.·.  ·UJU~·•..uluvu...WU·uu··•IRPDWPie U·-r--~·w...._.J·.-u·"UUWU_.-
.  until May 1994 becaJJM the uew buclpt law wu not approved yet by PadMment.  By the 
. cad oftbe  yell', the filcal.de6c:it hid readied Lei l.GVO.billion or-4.4%.of,GDP~:  T'bil·.wu.,..... . 
.. ,  .... ;.·.:.·,..,...ua,liDewith1he·nomiDII·defic:ircriteria·-.et•oUt~m~~~~,~,....  .. 
·· perceatl&8 of  GDP  ,· it,  ea:eeded tbe-illitill·progr~~D~De objective -because-of. the"'tnmger.vt"L' 
than expected alow-dOwll in jnflltioD that led to a downward revision of uominal GDP 
e-tim1!M for the year. 
l 
Tax reforms continued in 1994 with the introduction of  new profit tax. local tax and land 
tax l&ws  and inaeued excise duties.  Monetary financing  of the fiscal  deficit throup 
NBR. credits to· the govemment wu almost completely phased out between Mardl and 
November 1994.  However, strong iDcreue reoccurred in December of  that year when the 
government reverted from the commercial banks to the NBR. to. fiN  nee part of  its deficit. 
Strict monetary ad  .fiaca1 policy resulted in a rapid decrease in inflation, from over 3000Aa 
per year in November 1993 to less than  62,0~ per year at end 1994, considerably below the 
target of  7S% in the IMF programme. The authorities have now set a new anm1al target 
for 1995 at 25%, rather than the 40'~  envisaged iDitially in the programme. 
The CUI1'ent account deficit was considerably reduced,  from  US$ 1.2 billion in 1993 to 
US$ 0.3  billion in 1994.  This wu due to a strong export performance (+23% in dollar 
terms). driven mainly by the depreciation of the Leu  and by substantial payment arrears 
and delays in the domettic market  that encouraged  enterprises to sell abroad.  Imports 
increased by about 5% only.  Towards the end of  1994 and in early. 1995, current account 
presmres emerged again, partly as a result of  the appreciation of  the Leu in real terma. 
The capital account showed a marked increase in private direct and portfolio inveatmeats, 
reaching US$ 414 million, compared to US$ 14 million only in 1993.  But a slow-down 
has been r~ed  in loan disbursements compared to the timing in the programme.  Aa a 
result, the capital account surplus in 1994 remains below the programme tlrget. 
Official  foreign  exchange  (elei'Ves,  that  were  almost  depleted  at  the  end  of 1993, 
increued to more than US$ 620 million (1.2 months of imports) by mid-October  1994. 
However,. in the wake of  the re-ocamence of the exchange rate gap and the authorities' 
;;_ ·  ~  apparent willingness to keep the official exchange rat' below the market-clearing level, 
the National Bank sold part of  its reserves.  They fell to less than US$ 407 million at the 
end ofFebnwy 1995, wbea the National Bank resuJDed the purchase of  foreign exchange. 
· ·  .Foreign exchange holdings· in the overall banlcing~systmn.inaeasecUrom  USS 0.9-billion in,~ 
January to US$ 2 billion in December 1994. 
3.  Structunl reforms 
:. ,  -Imposing-financial-discipline on a:rears- and .loss-making state-owned <enterpriSes is a key 
objective  in  Romania's  1994-95  econorilic  stabilisation  programme.  However,  inter-
enterprise arrears increased to some Lei 7 billion or 14«'At of GDP by end  1994. Almost 
half of  these arrears are aecounted for by some 70 companies and regies autonomes which 
. have .been. targeted  for  strict  ijnancial .surveillance ... This. includes  isolati~n :ftom  the 
.  banking system, negotiation of conciliation agreements with their  ~reditors, and drawing • •  • 
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up and implementation of  Fmancial Recovery Plus.  If  no concihtjon ~  be reached, 
co11111Wcial iuo1veDcy proc:edurea would be activated.  l.iquidV.c~•l it, of coune.  DOt a 
realiltic solution for most of  the pu&lic utilities and viable fineac;.t recovery JJI'OII""''tw 
. would haVe to be eltlblilhed.  . .  :  /~  t.~ 
Padiagntuy approval of  the lcmg-overdue Co!Dmlrc:ialllllolvmcy Law Clme ill March · ' 
.  . ...  1995;  'I'hil Jaw •  a _,..,.,in  tbit4ia•ahec:G\W)'·•iltlif•·iht •  •-tbe.frolier~~,  .. 
·  ·~  .•.  ~,.,1epl ~-cOurt  .. CODiliiti<m procerlulw..betw-~4m  ..  onif't ·. 
It wiD permit •  iaitiatioll ofbaakruptcy-proceedinp while ilklwiaa ......_  .  .....,  ::  ~-
for rescue operltioDI.  ·  ·  ·  · 
Privatiaaticm of  ltate-owDed emerprilea ~  not made much propeu.  &d 199-i, 3;yein.  .  .. 
after the approval of  the privatization law, less thaD 900 out of -'.y  6,300 ltlte-oWDecl  ;.,~·-· 
compuiea- had· been fully traDiferred ·to private o'WDII'Ibip.  Molt of tbele were IIDIIl: 
compaiel,  privatized  through  MaDapmeot-Bmployee  Buy-Outs.  A:  ilew  Mus 
PrivatilatioD Prolflmme wu IDilOUilCed by the go~  in I1me 1~  with the lim of 
·privatiaiDg  IDOther  3,000. ~  by  June  1995.  However,  til pi'OII'IIDIDe wu 
approved by Padiament in March 199S only.  It wu.foreleen that at 1eut two oftbe five 
·: ..  ····_,:·- ..  ~major state-owaed:bBDkJ should be prepared for privatization in 199S but oaly oae baDk 
has so fir been DOJ!'rinfled, the Romanian Development Baak. 
4.  Implemeatatioa. of  macro-fiaucial auistaace 
Following RoiDIIlia'a aareement in principle with the IMF  ~n  a new programme for .1994-
95,  the  authorities· rtlquelted  the  EU and  the  G24  to  grant  fUrther  macro-financial 
usiltance to Romania to cover the residual external finandng pp of US$  27S  million . 
under the  1994-95 prognmme. Co~  by the EU/G-24 reached some USS  2•9 
million  or nearly  800.4.  of the  r~dual gap.  This  includes  furtMr  EU  macro-fiMncial 
assistance for an amount up to ECU 125 million, in two tranches, decided by the Council 
on 20 June 1994 (Decision 94/369/EC). In December 1994, the Commiasion agreed with 
the Romanian authorities the macro-economic conditions attached to the dilburHment of 
the loan. 
However,  by May 1995,  the first  tranche of ECU  SS  millioD  bad  not beeD  disbursed 
because of  alippaps in Romania's exclwn8e rate poliq' that ocCurred in the lut  quarter .of 
1994 and the first quarter of 1995. The Commission has, at seYeral occasions, expressed 
concern to the Romanian authorities over theae slippages and empbuised the need to re-
establish  a unified  exchange  rate  at  a fully  ~et-clearing level  before  disburieuient 
procedures can be activated.  · 
The disburaement  of the  second  trahche  is  linked  to  the  effective  implemeat.ation  of 
specific  structural  reform  measures,..  including  progress  in  prifttiation,  fiDancial  ,.c. 
restructuriDg of  lou-malring enterprises and banldng sector reforms, -agreed upon with the · · 
Romanilli authorities in the Memorandum of  Understanding. I  •  I  •  46 
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VID. SLOVAKIA 
1.  Iatroduetioa 
·.  ·  ·.  •  · · :  ·The c:liuolution of  the Czech and Slovak Federal.Republic (CSFR)·on l~Iamwy.,1993··hadMif.·. 
several negative implications for the Slovak -economy at a -time whea it wu still su1faiDs · 
· ftom the shock auociated with. the  .. djpnantJemem of  ~·  CoUDcil of.Mutual EcoDomic ,~.  · _ 
·  ·~  '·  ·  '-:. -~Auistance.  aod''fi'om:the ·difficulties 'accompanyiag· the tral(aition to· a-·market:eccmomy....&•- ·. 
puticular, the diaolution of  the federation implied the lojs of IUbst•ntial &leal triDifers ..  ~··--:-· 
from the Czech-lands,  w&ich contributed to the emergaice of  high budget  aDd  currem 
account deficiti in 1993.  Also~ the division of the CSFR disnlpted trade. with the Czech·  ·  ..  ...: 
Republic,  ~cted Slovakia•a · access· .to  the  internatioiW  capital  markets,  aod. was · 
followed by speculation against the Slovak crown which practically depleted  Stovakia•s· · :. ·· 
official foreign exchange reserves. 
In this  context,  the  Slovak  government  agreed  with  the  IMF in  mid-1993  on  an 
macroeconomic stabilization programme for the rest of  that year, wbich wu supported by 
the approval in July 1993  of a first purchase in the amount of SDR 64.4 million (about 
USS  100 million) under the IMF's Systemic Transformation Facility (STF).  In addition, 
the  World  Bank  granted  Slovakia  a  US$  80  million  Economic  Recovery  Loan  in 
November 1993. 
In July 1994, the IMF approved a 20-month stand-by credit and a second purchase under 
the STF totalling  SDR 180 million (or about US$  280  million),  in support of a more 
comprehensive  economic  programme for  1994-95.  In parallel,  the  World  Bank  began 
discussions on a possible Enterprise and Financial Sector Restructuring Loan (EFS~). 
The  macro-financial  assistance  and  programme  agreed  with  the international  financial 
institutions iimed at strengthening Slovakia•s delicate balance of  payments position and at 
supporting  the  country's, transformation  into  a  market  economy  following  the  shock 
associated with the split of  the CSFR. · 
In support of  this programme,·~  BU.Council adopted on 22 December 199416 a decision 
making available macro-financial assistance to Slovakia in the amount of  up to ECU 130 
million, as part of  a G-24 initiative to respond to the request by the Slovak authorities for 
complementary assistance (in the amount of  US$ 300 million).  Other members of  the G-
24 (mainly Japan, Austria and Switzerland) made further commitments amounting to US$ 
87.3 million. 
:~·. · '•  2.  Macroecoaomic developments 
All macroeconomic variables have been evolving favourably since the second quarter of 
1994.  Following  four  consecutive  years  of. recession,  the .Slovak .economy  recovered ··.:. 
··  strongly in 1994, with real GDP growing by 4.8% .and industrial production by 7%~  The 
recovery of  GDP was driven by a strong expansion of  net exports, which more than offset 
a new decline in domestic demand.  The ummployment rate,  for its part,  has  stabilized, 
althoup at a relatively high level of about  14.5%  (it stood at  14.6% in March  1995). 
· ;  ·'  GDP is projected to grow·again by about·4%-in 1995 as·domestie-demand·replaces net 
·  exports as a source of  growth.  • 
16  Decilion 94/939/EC. ...  I  I 
• 
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Year-on-year CPI inflation h,s declined from 25% in December 1993 to 11.3% in March 
· 1995, ·aDd the government's programme aims at further. reducing  ~t to 8% by' eact-1995. 
Wage growth,  by contrast,  accelerated in  1994, with real wages in the industrial sector 
·  growing by 7011 after declining in 1993 •. The government, however,. has decided to aboliab.-r,,.._ 
the tax on excessive Wage increases introduced last year.  -·~ 
.  · Substantial progress wg..~  in··t994·in:reduciag:.tJM ·budget-deficlt.~/Ib.e deficit; of·the..-.. . . 
·  ·general  govemment·c10sed;the·yeat~'lt~·2:7%~~of,·GDP;·"down··from.:.7~6',4· in•·1993.i-The#A 
bud8et for  1995 is co~t  with-a·general,govemment defidt of~  3% :~GDP.  · .... 
Also '!'onetary policy was tight in 1994. The net domestic assets of the b•nking ~ 
expand~  by only 2%, compared to the 5.5% growth that had been ptognnmMd and with 
a 11.1% growth in 1993.  T.ne  money  supply,  however,  grew futer than prognnnmed, · 
reflecting  the  rapid  expansion  of net  foreign  usets,  in  tum  a  coiisequence  of the 
turnaround  in  the balance of payments  position.  The  NBS  will  continue to conduct  a 
prudent monetary policy in 1995. It bU decided to maintain until end-1995 the individual 
credit ceilings on banks introduced in February 1994, ~d  will aim at a 4.5% growth of  net 
domestic assets and a 12.3% growth ofM2 in 1995. 
The balance of  payments has experienced a clear improvement since the second QUarter of 
1994. The current account swung from a deficit ofUS$ 0.6 bn (5.4% ofGDP) itl1993 to 
a surplus  of US$  712  million  (6%  of GDP)  in  1994.  The  main  factors  behind  this 
improvement seem to be the decline of domestic demand, the devaluation of  the Slovak 
crown  (including  within  the bilateral  clearing  system)  and  the  imposition of the  10% 
import surcharge in March 1994. 
/ 
The improvement in the current account has been particularly marked vis-a-vis the Czech 
Republic,  with the bilateral  balance  reaching  a US$  806  million  surplus  in  1994.  The 
turnaround in Slovakia's current account vis-a-vis the Czech Republic has been reflected 
in  the  balance  of the  bilateral  ECU  clearing  account.  Following  a  substantial  deficit 
position for Slovakia in late 1993 and early 1994, the account hu been showing a Slovak 
surplus, with the Czech Republic consistently exceeding the ECtJ 130 million credit limit 
beyond which payments must be settled in hard-currency. 
The capital account has also improved. About US$ 295 million of  official macro-financial 
assistance (IMF,  World Bank's  Economic Recovery Loan  and  Japan EximBank) have 
been  disbursed  since  mid-1994.  In addition,  the  NBS  issued  in  July  1994  a US$  250 
million bond in the Samurai market. FDI increased from about US$ 100 million in 1993 to 
US$  184  million  in  1994,  although it remains  low  (1.5%  of GDP).  Finally,  the  tight 
management  of inter-bank  liquidity  by  the  NBS,  in  combination  with  the  perceived 
stability  of the  Slovak  crown  (and,  in  the  first  half of 1995,  the  expectation  of a 
revaluation against the Czech crown), has led to some short-term capital inflows.  , 
These favourable trends in both the current and the capital account have been translated 
into a substantial 'increase in reserves. Official foreign exchange reserves have risen from 
US$ 41 S million at end-1993 to US$ 2.2 bn in April 1995, or about 3 months of  imports. 
I 
In April  1995, the US rating agency Standard & Poors upgraded· Slovakia's- rating from 
BB- to BB+,  or just one notch below the investment grade category.  Moody's  is  also 
considering an upgrading of its rating to Slovakia.  All this should have a positive impact 
on the country's access to the international capital markets. ...  48 
Following a  100h devaluation ia July  1993, the Uchtl1tp rate of the Slovak crown has 
been kept stable  apinst a hisket ofWatem curraacies.  In July  1994,  the  DUIDber  of 
cwreades in the buket wu reduced tom five to tWo (the DeuUche mark and  the US 
dollar). In December  .. t993,.the.Slovalt.crown.ud the Czech. croWD were,  retpeetively, .,;·;: 
· ·  ·· · · ··  ·  · devalued· by ·  S%  ·and  revaluecl-by ·.  3%~  within:· the, clelriDa .l)'ltem; HoweVer, -the  3%  ~~.~  ~ 
· revaluation of  the Czer.h crown was rewned in March 1994, aDd in mid-May, in  respo~~~e 
·  ·  ·  ··  ·.·· •  ·~ .1o growiq speculation on a- renlultioll-of~-the·'Slovak...uown  within the-deariua-tl)'ltemiM 
· ...  : •··  ··,;.,.the devaluation·ofthe Slovak-curreacy-wul'eduCediioai-5%to '1%.-;-· _  .  ..:.  ·  · •. ,  A.: ...  ·. •<·  ''·'~ 
. 3.  Straetaral refOI'DII 
The Slovakian authorities  annOUDCed in Spring  1994 a plan to accelerate privat;zatlon , 
bued on a areater reliance on voucher privatization. AJ of  end-August 1994, about Sk 65 
billion ·worth of equity had  been  slated  for inclusion in the  aeconc:i  wave  of vOucher  ' 
privatization, aad between September IBd November 1994 about 3.S million citiZens (out .. 
of  a total-r>f 3.8 million eHgible citizens) bad registered to buy vouchers. 
The political stalemate followiog the~  30/0ctober 1 geoenl dectiOD,  and the 
redefiuition of the priVatization strategy by the new government resulted in a sigaificant 
delay of  the privatization proced; The aewly elected Parliament invalidated  10111e direct-
sale privatization ccintn,cts concluded by the interim government after 6 September 1994, 
and the voucher ~·has  been signifir.tntly scaled down and delayed. The empbuis is 
expected to be swnc~·  ~  ftom voucher to standard methods. Priority will be given to 
direct ales to  strategic investors,  including  sales through instalments to managers  and 
~lo~.  . 
In the area of baiuang sector Tejorm,  new,  stricter regulations on the clusification and 
provisicming  of bad  loai:ls  C~;~De into  force  in March  1995.  The  Slovak  Parliament is 
expected tO pass by mid-1995 amendments to tilt tax taws granting full tax deductibility 
for bad-loan ptoviaiqna ~by  banks  du'ring  1995-97.  Banks  wishing to temporarily 
benefit from the full tax decJuctihility of provisions will have to commit themselves to a 
restructuring· programme  approved  by the  NBS,  will  not  be  permitted  to  distribute 
dividends for several yean and will have to make substantial efforts to reduce or keep in 
check operational costs (including wiaa). It is also hoped that the cmaoina strengthening 
of  the Slovak economy will have some positive effect on the problem of  non-performing 
loans. 
The authorities are studying the l)Ossible introduction of  a Deposit Insurance Scheme, and 
are preparing changes in the NBS and commercial bank acts aimed at strengthening the 
supervision and intervstion poWers of  the central bank. 
Following abuses and irregularities by .certain .inwstment privatization .funds (JPFs)  and·;. 
investmmt companies, the Ministry of  Fmance has restricted the operations of several of · 
them and is pianing to tighten  their regulation.  The legal  amendments  being  prepared 
would  aim  at  increasing  the  transparency  and  control of their  activities,  and  at better 
protecting the interests of  the shareholders of  the IPFs. There is, however, some concern 
that the amendments may also limit tbe IPFs' role in corporate governance. , · .-· 
The Ministry of Economy has placed under liquidation 168 state-owned enterprises that 
· are under its jurisdictio11;  although the process has been completed for only 12 of  them. 
, ..  . The appOinted .state liquidators. are. having difficulty. in selling their assets,  largely due to 
the excess supply in the real estate market. Also, the authorities are preparing amendments 
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to  the  Bankruptcy  and  Conciliation  Law  aimed  at  some  existing  deficiencies  and 
permittilig a more speedy resolution of  cases. 
The.govemment is committed to making the CTownju/ly convertibkfor.current.account ·  .· •. 
.  , -··  purposes by  1- January  1996.  Consistent with this,· the NBS raised ·the foreign. exchange  . ,·  .. 
travel allowance by two thirds (to the equivalent ofUSS 500 per year per person)' as of  1. 
January -1995._ The. Czech-Slovak.clearing.-system!'is·::expecteci ·to. be{:terminated· in. the·.·-~ 
-.  · ',  ..  ·second half of 1995.· In May  1995, .the.Czech government~  decided to formally request its.,.~.j.~ 
elioUnation.  · 
In  addlti~n to theJr  plans  to  introduce full  current  account convertibility  by  1 Januacy 
1996, the authorities are envisaging the liberalization of  several types of  capital outflows 
and inflows,  and  in  particular  outward  direct  investment,  which  is · still  subject  to 
authorization by the NBS.  The NBS  is finalizing  a new Foreign Exc~e  Act that will 
provide the appropriate regulatory framework  for  both the introduction of full  current 
account convertibility and the partial liberalization of  capital movements. 
Despite the clear improvement of  the current account and balance of  payments, the Slovak 
authorities announced in early  1995  their intention to maintain until  end-1996  ~e 10% 
import  surcharge  introduce  in  March  1994.  The  current  government  plan  implies  the 
reduction to 7.5% of  the surcharge by end-1995 and its gradual elimination in the course 
of 1996 provided that the balance of payments position remains satisfactory. In justifying 
their  decision,  the  Slovak  authorities  argue  that  the  expected  recovery  of domestic 
demand,  the  planned  introduction  of  full  current  account  convertibility  and  the 
liberalization of some capital outflows could negatively affect the balance of  payments in 
1995 and 1996. 
Most prices have  been  liberalized.  The  share  of items  that  still  have  regulated  prices 
represents only about  5% of total turnover.  These items include energy (electricity,  gas 
and heating,  petrol), water,  pharmaCeutical products, rents,  telephone and telegraph and 
public transportation. Prices for electricity (particularly those paid by households), gas and 
- heating  are  sigQiticantly  below  their economic  cost recovery  levels.  Electricity  and  gas 
tariffs  have  practically  not  been  adjusted  since  1991.  The  authorities  are  expected  to 
present by end-June 1995 a plan to gradually bring in the coming years those prices close 
to their economic cost recovery levels. 
4.  Implementation of macro-Financial Assistance 
The  programme  agreed  with  the  IMF  for  1994-95  remains  on  track.  Although  the 
implementation  of some  of the  structural  reform  conditions  has  been  delayed,  all  the 
macroeconomic targets and quantitative performance criteria have until now been met. 
Given the improvement in the balance of payments, however, the. Slovak government has-
announced that it will not draw, for the time being, on the remaining tranches of  the stand-
by credit. 
In the first  half of 1995,  the  Commission  held  preliminary discussions  with  the  Slovak 
•  .. - authorities on the economic policy conditions .to be related to•the·implementation of the 
EU macro-financial assistance.  In this context, the Commission emphasized that,  in view 
of the favourable  developments in the external account,  the situation was  propitious to 
start implementing a phasing-out of  the 10% import surcharge without further delay. The 
. Commission also insisted on the importance of  continued progress in the area of structural J  •  t  I  so 
~ 
reform,  in particular with respect  to  privatizatio~ entreprise restructuring and  banking 
sector reform. 
.. : . Reprdiag·the diabursemeDt of  the complementary macro-financial.uaistance committed.·., .. 
by·odler G-24 members, Japan released its US$"'60 million· auistance in early May 199S.·  ~ 
This wu  dcme in the form of  loan &om 'the Japanese Bxim Bank in co-financing .with the  .. 
· ... World Blllk's Economic Recovery Loan.  - ·· .  --~  .~·. · . .  -·  ·  .·  ·.  .  ., ..,. ... I  I 
' 
Sl 
IX.  UKRAINE 
1.  Introduction 
In Autumn  1994, following the election of President Kucbma, the Ukrainian· authorities ·  .. r 
took a major  step ·towards transforming  their  economy into  a market-based  one.  This 
came after three years during which economic policy  .. had been· almost totally paralyZed by:·~ 
·political deadlock and· widespread •scepticism ·about. market-orientectref'Qrm. Jn.;a.radical: ·:,: 
change  of e<>urse,  the  authorities  adopted  a  bold  and  comprehensive  programme  of . 
economic stabilization and reform which was supported by an IMP arrangement under the 
Systemic  Transformation  Facility  (STF)  approved  in  October  1994  and · a  stand-by 
arrangement approved in Aprill99S, as well as a rehabilitation !pan from the World Bank· 
approved in December 1994. 
On 22 December  1994, the Council of the European Union decided17 to dl&ke available 
macro-financial  assistance in the form  of a ten-year  loan of lJP  to ECU  85  million to 
support Ukraine's adjustment and reform process.  This assistance was understood to be 
complementary to that provided by the International Financial Institutions as well as by 
other bilateral donors  .. The EU loan was made conditional upon agreement between IMF 
and  Ukraine  on a stand-by  arrangement  and  the rapid  implementation  of the  EU/G-7 
Nuclear Safety Action Plan for the closure of Chemobyl.  In addition,  it was understood 
that the  mobilization of macro-financial  assistance  for  Ukraine' ·would  require  that the 
country fully and timely services its financial obligations towards the Commuility and that 
burdensharing with other bilateral donors is satisfactory. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The  Ukrainian  stabilization  and  reform  programme  was  adopted  in  a  very  difficult 
environment.  With  the  move  of energy  prices  towards  world  market  levels  starting in 
1992, Ukraine had suffered severe terms of  trade shocks. Given the heavy dependence of 
its production on energy,  Ukraine was forced to reduce import volumes both for energy 
and other goods, adding further to the economic decline. Following a 38% decline of real 
GOP in the period  1990-93, output contracted another 23% in 1994. The impact of the 
output collapse of  the official economy was only partly offset by the rapid growth of the 
informal sector.  In  1994, the current account balance deteriorated further to a deficit of 
US$  1. 1 bn,  with the  accumulation  of external  arrears  providing  the  financing  for  the 
balance  of payments  in  the  first  three  quarters.  Although  inflation  had  been  reduced 
substantially  in  the  course  of 1994  from  record  levels  observed  in  1993,  renewed 
relaxation  of financial  policies  in  Summer  1994  had  created  potential  new  inflation 
pressures. 
Under these difficult circumstances,  the Ukrainian authorities made substantial progress  · 
with economic stabilization in the fourth quarter of 1994; all quantitative financial targets 
for  end  1994 under  the  STF  were  observed,  each  by  a  significant  margin.  A  major 
tightening of the budget was implemented bringing the deficit in  1994 down to 8.6% of 
GOP  and limiting monetary financing of the government in the fourth quarter to  S%  of 
· GOP.  The bulk of fiscal adjustment relied on the expenditure side;·in ·partict,llar through 
sharp reductions in subsidies to coal mines, agriculture and  ~mmunal  services. Monetary 
17  Decision 94/940/EC. I  •  ,. 
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conditions were also tightened. In late October, commercial credit to the non-government 
sector was ffozen  for  the remainder of 1994 and .  the central bank's  refinance  rate was 
increased significantly. At first, the impact of  these measures on inflation was not apparent 
given the inflation potential in. the economy and.the liberalization. of  prices undertaken-asr*-
part of the reform programme. Monthly  ~tion  rates in the order of 2-3% in Summer  ·. 
1994 increased sharply up to a maximum 72% in November  1994. 'Since theJi,  there has 
. been a continuous-decline of  inflation down to a monthly rate of  5. 8% in April·~  9~5.'  ,.  · '• ·  ·  ~;~~--
The balance of payments remained very tight throughout  1994. In the last quarter 1994, 
Ukraine received  foreign  assistance from  International Financial  Institutions,· as well as · 
contributions and  pledges from  bilateral  donors  to fill the residual  fiilancing.· gap  (after 
contributions of IFis are accounied for)  estimated at  US$  600 million.  Apart from  the 
rescheduling of-arrears  by  Rus~a and  Turkmenistan (some  US$  350 million),  bilateral  · · 
contributions reached  some  US$  200 million,  including  a US$  70  million  contribution 
· from the US  and. US$ 5 million from the Netherlands.  As a consequence,  Ukraine was 
able to remain current on payments for imports.  It also settled part of payments arrears. 
Official international reserves increased somewhat, but with 2 weeks of  imports at the end 
of  1994, the level remained low. 
At this difficult juncture of the stabilization process, the Ukrainian authorities decided to 
continue and enhance their ambitious stabilization and reform programme in  1995 in the 
context of an  IMF stand-by  programme  (providing  Ukraine,  together· with the  second 
tranche of  the STF, with some US$  1.9 billion). Other bilateral donors (including Russia, 
the US, Japan, the EU) are providing complementary assistance. 
The programme for  1995  aims  at bringing monthly  inflation down to  1% in December 
1995. One important dement in this strategy is the sharp  reduction of the State budget 
deficit to 3.3% ofGDP. Budgetary expenditures will be generally reduced by over 100/o of 
GDP compared to their 1994 level, except for social expenses and subsidies to households 
which will be increased from 6.2% to 8.5% of GDP.  The National Bank of Ukraine has · 
adopted a monetary programme that is consistent with this budget and with the objective 
of  lower inflation. 
In the  first  quarter of 1995,  the  Ukrainian  authorities  have  implemented  the  financial 
policies envisaged in their programme.  This has resulted in a containment of inflationary 
pressures and a stabilization of the exchange rate.  All performance criteria for end-March 
were met, except for those relating to the accumulation of  arrears. 
3.  Structuralrefor10s 
The Ukrainian aut)lorities have also launched a programme of  ambitious structural reform, 
even  though  much  remains  to  be  done  and  several  actions  subject  to  structural 
benchmarks ·under  the  STF  were  postponed.  Under  the  programm~ the  authorities 
advanced rapidly towards -full price liberalization, including with the revoking of controls 
on  profit  margins.  Administered  prices  set  by  the  State  were  raised  for  rents,  utility 
charges, bread and energy products. The government also took a number of steps toward 
· reducing the role of the government,  including the (ormulation of the mass privatization 
programme for  1995  and  the  preparation of the  elimination  of the  old  system of state 
orders starting from  I January  1995. To  shelte~ vulnerable groups from the impact of the 
adjustment measures, minimum pensions and social benefits were raised.  · '  IJ 
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Liberalization of the foreign exchange market proceeded well in the fourth quarter.  The 
government has already decided to abolish all remaining quotas and licenses other than.on 
grain  and  goods  subject  to  voluntary  export  restraint  (VER)  under  international 
agreements.  It also intends to abolish quotas on ferrous and non-ferrous metals and  on  !'!1. 
grain  by  mid-1995.  The  authorities- have  reduced  substantially  the  foreign  currency 
surrender requirements for export receipts to  100~ and consider abolishing it complet~y. 
The Ukrainian government also envisages-to largely complete priccrderegulation=~'  1995 ·'J 
by removing the existing restrictions on price increases by artificial monopolies. Prices of 
goods and services provided by natural monopolies are being further adjusted. ensuring a· 
gradual decline in subsidies. A major privatization effort is undertaken in 1995, aiming at 
the  rompletion of the privatization of 8,000  medium  and  large enterprises  by year-end 
through vouchers, as well as of  90% of  small-scale enterprises. Foreigners will be allowed 
to  participate  in  cash  privatization.  The  authorities  also  intend  to  improy~ enterprise 
governance. Bankruptcy procedures are expected to be simplified and land reform will be 
further pursued. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The EU loan of ECU 85  million decided on 22 December 1994 was to be disbursed in a 
single tranche conditional upon an IMP stand-by arrangement and a rapid implementation 
of  the EU/G-7 Nuclear Safety Action Plan for Ukraine.  As of  May  1995, with the stand-
by  arrangement  approved  and  on track,  and  substantial  progress  achieved  towards  the 
closure of  the Chemobyl nuclear power plant, the Commission intends to proceed rapidly 
with the implementation of  the ECU 85 million loan facility. 
In view of  the further considerable financing needs of  Ukraine in the context of  the stand-
by  arrangement,  the  EU  is  currently  considering  a second  long-term loan  in  favour  of 
Ukraine  that  would  complement  financial  assistance  from  the  international  financial 
institutions and other bilateral donors. The Commission adopted a proposal in thi.s respect 
on 16 May 1995. 